Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/78

64 GEOBGE GALLOWAY: his treatment of this distinction is greatly influenced by the general theory of experience which he found it necessary to postulate. He could not admit that the self was real in the sense of maintaining its identity amid its changing activities. Hence the fact of external perception was judged necessary to give the contrast of permanence over against inner changes. Yet in Kant's theory it is impossible to understand how a pure form of perception like space, when somehow super- induced on an affection of sense which is mysteriously given, could, even with the necessary help of the schematised categories, produce those localised objects in space which fill the field of outer experience. It is conceivable that spatial and temporal relations may have been evolved out of sense- affection as a form which is implicitly contained in it ; but it is not intelligible how pure forms of intuition could be read into an alien matter. We refrain, however, from entering on a detailed criticism of Kant, for it will generally be ad- mitted that his theory of knowledge is too unsystematic, too little penetrated by the notion of development, to be accepted as it stands. The motto simplex sigillum veri may not always be true, but the cumbersome and ill-adjusted machinery of the Critique of itself provokes doubt and unbelief. Let us ratlaer see how Kant's view on this subject is amended and developed by Dr. Caird in his well-known treatise on the Philosophy of Kant. 1 Inner and outer experience we are there told are only different stages in the development of consciousness, which in another aspect is the development of the object. From the simplest determinations of the object in space and time we -advance organically through the categories, or forms of judgment, to the world as completely determined by reason or self-consciousness, which if logically posterior is the real presupposition of the whole movement. The later and more highly articulated stage of this development is, properly speaking, inner experience, and it can only be distinguished from the consciousness of the world in the sense that it is that consciousness in a more completely developed form. But as each fact of experience involves a reference to the self, so every outer experience will have its inner side. On the other hand, there is no inner experience which is not also outer, but we call it inner because the inner side is specially reflected on, in other words we definitely recognise it as belonging to the self. That there are elements of truth in this statement we do l Phil. of Kant, vol. I, 614 ff.