Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/83

THE DISTINCTION OF INNER AND OUTER EXPERIENCE. 69 experience has the special character which attaches to it, because it directly implies that the subject is influenced by realities other than itself. The subject creates the dis- tinction, but it does so as its interpretation of a real difference within the whole of its experience. We must now try to form a more definite conception of of this transsubjective reality which we find it necessary to postulate. But we require to state our position in this re- ference with some care. It will not do to argue that in "physical events" as distinguished from the subjective sequence of ideas we have the fundamental notion of ex- ternality. 1 For a ' physical event ' is by no means a primitive datum of consciousness but implies ideal construction ; and it is absurd to suppose that the object as it exists for developed consciousness has the same significance apart from conscious- ness. Influenced by these considerations, J. S. Mill, as is well known, defined matter as "a permanent possibility of sensations"; and he explains that these "permanent possi- bilities " are "not constructed by the mind itself but merely recognised by it ". 2 That which persists through changes and has capacities must in some sense be real ; but Mill gives us no light as to how we are to think of this reality. Nor, on the whole, has Kant's treatment of the subject been helpful. His " thing in itself " is at one point regarded as the positive source of sensations, but afterwards it is fined down to a mere limiting notion. 3 On neither view is the process of experience intelligible ; and the conclusion seemed inevitable that philosophy must either return to the realism of Locke or advance to the absolute idealism of the post-Kantian thinkers. Without committing ourselves to this inference we may frankly allow that the notion of " things in them- selves " is inconsistent as well as useless. That which ex hypothesi possesses no knowable qualities can never be coerced into active relations with elements within conscious experi- ence. If this were possible the original assumption must have been wrong, and the ' thing in itself ' instead of being an impenetrable mystery has some affinity to consciousness. It might seem, then, that in trying to do justice to the facts of outer experience we have reached an impasse. On the one side it appears impossible to explain the facts of sense- 1 Vide, MIND, N.S., No. 22, p. 222. a Exam, of Hamilton, 6th ed., p. 239. 3 With this we may compare the Aristotelian VTJ which is sometimes spoken of as mere privation o-repjjo-ts, and at other times is regarded as a positive means through which individuals are differentiated.