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EXISTENCE AND CONTENT. 81 may be sought in various ays. We may postulate with Bradley an inclusive immediate Experience in which the contradictions and discrepancies of reflective thinking are overcome and shown to be somehow real contributions to the active life of the Whole. Such a standpoint, however, can never lead us beyond the conviction that somehow' or other the diremption effected by thought must be made good. To Bradley's mind the solution can never be given properly until the content of the Whole is grasped in an imme- diate perfect way : knowledge in other words is validated only in the Absolute. For us it must remain hopelessly infected, constitu- tionally diseased. If the nature of each factor is valid only when its position in an absolute synthesis is found, it is evident that we are left without any working criterion whatever. And no matter what else is true, this must be granted, that thought and knowledge appear to have meaning for the finite and the human. It is evident, therefore, that although we grant to Bradley a distinct contribution in forcing upon us a reconsideration of the problem of Knowledge, his own contentions do not lead us to any positive outcome. The true solution of the difficulty is to be found in a closer examination into the function of thought. Mean- ing is constituted through the development of ideas. What is true, therefore, of ideas must also be true of thought and of knowledge. Now ideas are symbols, and their function is regulative, not con- stitutive. Instead of supposing that ideas serve the purpose of setting a limit to reflexion, we must regard them as instruments of control in mediating exchanges between different aspects of experience or in transforming one into the other. So surely as ideas are set up as limits to the process of Eeflexion, so surely must we sacrifice the immediate to the mediate without thought, or on the other hand regard the process as impossible or illegiti- mate. In either case difficulty awaits us. If, however, ideas are no longer set up as limits to reflexion, but are regarded as instruments of control, we avoid the old contradictions by removing the source of difficulty and at least place the problem upon a different plane. And what is demanded at this point is that we carry through the analysis of ideation and meaning. When we do so, it becomes evident that our contention is well founded. It has been recog- nised by logicians that ideas are symbols, and still full use has not been made of the information thus gained. As symbols, ideas have a double value. They project in our minds (a) the antici- pations of certain definite experiences ; (6) the conditions under which these experiences may be realised. Meaning, therefore, is essentially regulative. As an anticipation, it flashes before us the determinate experiences which we may expect in a given set of circumstances : as a condition, it calls our attention to the means by which the experiences may be realised. Knowledge rests, generally, upon the recognition that new experiences can be realised through the operation of appropriate conditions, and specifically upon the determination of the exact conditions which 6