Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/111

j. A. STEWART, The Myths of Plato. 97 into contact with truth somehow " (<W dX-^^eias irrj irpocra.Tnono). It is undoubtedly implied that, whatever truth there may be in prophecy and myth is entirely due to their being images, however imperfect, of rational thought, and this is quite in harmony with Plato's view of the things with which myth deals. They too are but images of reality. It is also quite in accordance with the atti- tude of ironical respect which he adopts towards everything which gives itself out as ' inspired '. It professes to be higher than know- ledge, but is really lower. It is a mere makeshift demanded by the weakness of human nature. It is this which explains the feature of Plato's style which I pointed out above, and which I think Prof. Stewart's translation obscures. There is a touch of parody in Plato's prophetic language, and he loves to bring it into close contact with everyday speech, just as Aristophanes does his burlesques of tragic diction. It appears to me that Prof. Stewart has been misled by his use of Kantian terms and distinctions. It is true, no doubt, that the myths deal chiefly with the Soul, the World, and God, and that these correspond to the three " Ideas of Eeason " in Kant's system. But it is not true that they occupy the corresponding place in Plato's philosophy. So far as anything does correspond to the " Ideas of Eeason," it is the Form of the Good (by no means to be identified with God), and even that differs from them in the most important respect ; for Plato would never admit that it could not be an object of experience. So far as the Soul, the World, and God are not objects of possible experience for Plato, that is because they are finite and partial, not because they are ideal wholes. The right method, as it seems to me, of determining the place and function of myth in Plato's dialogues is to study the hints and there are many which he himself gives us as to what is mythical and what is not, and then to examine our results in the light of those passages in which the theory of myth is discussed. If we do this, we shall, I think, be forced to the conclusion that for Plato everything is mythical except the Ideas and (in a secondary sense) the mathematical sciences. There are certain formulas which Plato uses again and again to mark the distinction. When the Ideas are introduced, the chief speaker generally appeals to the others whether their reality is not to be asserted in the most positive way, and his interlocutor is made to reply without hesitation that it is. We must remember that we do not possess Plato's ' acroamatic ' discourses, and that the proper place for a full exposition of the doctrine of Ideas would be his lectures in the Academy. The fiction of the dialogues is usually that the speakers know all about the Ideas already and are fully convinced of the truth of the theory. The most striking instance of this is the Parmenides, where, though the difficulties of the doctrine are the subject of the dialogue, the doc- trine itself is represented as common ground to Socrates and Parmenides. Other doctrines are introduced in a very different way. We are told that it is " not worth while for a wise man to 7