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DAVID G. RITCHIE, Philosophical Studies. 105 blunders or serious misstatements. In his general defence of idealism, I doubt whether he has sufficiently guarded against Sub- jective Idealism. The statement (p. 187) that objectivity means ' validity and coherence for other selves as well as for self ' can hardly be called clear. The reference to non-Euclidean geometry in the paper on ' Logic and Psychology ' (pp. 150-151) seems to me to miss the point. The criticisms on Hedonism are seldom enlightening, and sometimes appear to be positively crude. It is surely, for instance, not a real criticism on any modern hedonistic theory to say (p. 299) : ' If we use happiness in the sense in which it is used in ordinary language, the end is not happiness. Happi- ness is mainly dependent on the healthy state of the bodily secre- tions.' And probably one or two other passages might be noted in which the statements are somewhat unguarded or open to question. But, in general, it may be safely said that Ritchie's high reputation for careful and minute accuracy will be fully sustained by this posthumous volume. Indeed, where there is so much to praise and so little to cavil at, I am almost inclined to retract what was said before about the disappointing and tantalising character of the contents. At any rate, it might be fair to add that, if parts are disappointing, it is largely because other parts have raised our expectations so high. I may say, however, that what I find most tantalising in Ritchie's writing is the way in which fundamental difficulties are frequently set aside by means of statements that appear to be taken as axiomatic. Thus, on page 185, he says ' " Will," unless it be taken in a quite artificial sense, implies motives, which it is absurd to imagine as acting on " the Absolute " '. Does will necessarily imply motives ' acting on ' some one ? May not the Absolute be thought as involving process and implying an end? The move- ment of thought seems here to be checked by a pure assumption. It was, in the main, instances of this kind that I had in view when I said that Ritchie seems often to stop short just when he comes upon the ultimate problem. But perhaps we ought not to complain of this. An essay on a philosophical subject must no doubt involve presuppositions ; and at least Ritchie nearly always makes his presuppositions very clear. Moreover, he constantly shows readiness to reconsider them, and view them in new lights. Everywhere throughout the volume there is the charm of freshness, the charm of thought in the making. We seem to be listening to a sustained conversation almost as in one of Plato's dialogues passing rapidly from point to point, and illuminating everything by incisive utterance and humorous illustration. It is perhaps, after all, only the superabundance of good things that one finds tantalis- ing ; as if flash upon flash of lightning kept out the sunlight. Yet it is all thoroughly coherent and scientific ; and there is perhaps more to be learned from it, in reality, than from many volumes that seem more complete and systematic. But it is certainly diffi- cult to give a connected account of its contents in a review. The