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NEW BOOKS. 113 able and effective criticism of the paradoxes of that would-be revolutionary moralist. Nietzsche, says M. Fouillee, "n'est pas capable de dire deux mots de vrais sans en aj outer trois de faux ". And with much clearness and point our author brings out again and again the elements of fallacious exaggeration and distortion that go to make up Nietzsche's often far from novel heresies. In numerous passages he exposes very happily the easy device by which Nietzsche and his disciples undertake to level down all moral values. All values, all actions are but expressions of the universal "Wille zur Macht," therefore no one of them is better than another. Forcefulness is shown as much in badness as in goodness, and it is the same forcefulness that is shown in both. M. Fouillee shows how in- cessantly these fallacies and ambiguities take the place of serious argument. To take only one of the many passages one might quote : " Pour toute espece d'homme [according to Nietzsche] demeuree vigoureuse et pres de la nature, 1'amour et la haine, la reconnaissance et la vengeance, la bonte et la colere, 1'action affirmative et 1'action negative sont insepar- ables : ' On est bon, a condition que Ton sache aussi etre m^chant ; on est mechant parce que, autrement, on ne saurait etre bon ' . . . ' L'homme bon est 1'hemiplegique de la vertu ' . . . Tel est le sophisme de Nietzsche, d^passant ceux de Callicles ou de Polus, et qui eut fait la joie de Socrate. Ce dernier n'aurait pas manqud de dire : D'apres ton raisonnement, 6 mon ami, 1'homme n'est bien portant qu'a la condition d'etre malade ; une bonne santd est 1'hemiplegie de la sante ; bien plus, 1'hemiple'gie elle- meme est necessaire pour le plein et entier usage du corps." HENRY BARKER. L'Objet de la Metaphysique selon Kant et selon Aristote, par C. SENTROUL, Docteur en Philosophic. Louvain : Institut Supe"rieur de Philo- sophic, 1905. Pp. 240. " Boused from his dogmatic slumber " by Hume, Kant's aim in philo- sophy was the restoration of certainty and peace. But in labouring for this restoration the wizard of Konigsberg raised up spirits too potent even for himself to lay. Since Kant, philosophy has been like a haunted house where no man can rest. Those who have gone farthest with him have insisted on going beyond him, and have filled the house of philo- sophy with weirder and still weirder spectral forms. Then has been sounded the cry of alarm 'back to Kant'. M. Sentroul proposes a still further regress, ' back to Aristotle,' back to the philosophy of the ' plain man,' who will have it that the object of metaphysics is ' being,' that thoughts come of impressions of things, that all science and all philosophy is simply Nature revealing herself to the thinking mind, not the thinking mind imposing its forms upon an outside world, which is ultimately nothing but its own creation. M. Sentroul is an intelligent and even sympathetic opponent, and draws the great lines of Kantian thought with a nettetZ lacking in the original, at the same time abundantly bearing out his every statement by Kant's own words. He agrees with Jacobi that the reality of the external world, so vehemently affirmed by Kant, is a " subjective reality," which means, not that things are, but that the mind is under an intel- lectual necessity of taking them to be (pp. 107-108). He points an interesting contrast beween the Kantian and the Aristotelian theory of perception (pp. 134-135). The bringing in of ' practical reason ' to remedy the breakdown of 'pure reason' was not, according to M; Sentroul, an after-thought with Kant, bxit was part of his initial intention in writing the Critique of Pure Reason. This is argued from the Prolegomena 8