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THE AMBIGUITY OF TRUTH. 173 out suffering rejection. No truth moreover can do more than do its duty and fulfil its function. I hope that these definitions will have sufficiently borne out the claim made at the beginning that the pragmatic view of truth unifies experience and rationalises the classifi- cation of the normative sciences ; but it may not be amiss to add a few words on both these topics. That, in the first place, the conception of the logical judgment as a form of valuation connects it with our other valuations and repre- sents it as an integral part of the e<e<m rov ayuBov, of the purposive reaction upon the universe which bestows dignity and grandeur upon the struggle of human life is, I take it, evident. The theoretic importance of this conception is capital. It is easily and absolutely fatal to every form of Naturalism. For if every ' fact ' upon which any natural- istic system relies is at bottom a valuation, arrived at by selection and purposive manipulation, there is a manifest absurdity in eliminating the human reference from results which have implied it at every step. The pragmatic doctrine (at all events in its ' humanist ' development) affords a pro- tection against Naturalism which ought to be the more appreciated by those interested in taking a ' spiritual ' view of life now that it has become pretty clear that the protection afforded by idealistic absolutism is quite illusory. For the '* spiritual nature of the Absolute ' does nothing to succour the human aspirations strangled in the coils of materialism : ' absolute spirit ' need merely be conceived naturalistically to become as impotent to aid the theologian and the moralist as it has long been seen to be to help the scientist. And the unification of logic with the other normative sciences is even more valuable practically than theoretically. For it vindicates man's right to present his claims upon the universe in their integrity, as a demand not for Truth alone, but for Goodness, Beauty and Happiness as well, commingled with each other in a fusion one and indiscerptible ; and what perhaps is for the moment more important still, it justifies our efforts to bring about such a union as we desire. Whether this ideal can be attained, cannot, of course, be certainly predicted ; but a philosophy which gives us the right to aspire, and inspires us with the daring to attempt, is surely a great improvement on monisms which, like Spinoza's, crush us with blank and illogical denials of the relevance of human valuations to the truth of things. In technical philosophy however it is good form to profess more interest in the formal relations of the sciences than in the cosmic claims and destinies of man, and so I hasten