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284 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. Montague. ' Panpsychism and Monism. ' [Strong's theory is a ' Dar- winization of Berkeley,' but insufficient.] P. Hughes. ' Dr. Bush's Definition of Consciousness ' : [II. 21.] II. 24. Kate Gordon. ' Feeling and Conception.' [' To point out the intimacy of the way in which feeling influences thought.'] W. S. Monroe. 'Mental Elements of Dreams.' [Questionnaire results.] J. Dewey. ' The Knowledge Experience and its Relationships.' ["Validity is not definable or measurable in terms of the knowledge content if isolated, but only of the function of the know- ledge experience in subsequent experiences," while " needs are not met more or less usefully ; they are met more or less successfully, and the successful fulfilment defines the useful thing of the situation."] B. H. Bode. ' Cognitive Experience and its Object.' [Discusses Dewey : II. 15.] II. 25. F. Arnold. 'Association and Atomism.' [Association should be considered as functional, not atomistic, and appreciated as it is.] I*. P. Boggs. ' The Psychical Complex called an Interest.' [" An interest is a self in that it is the whole of consciousness, but the idea of self is conspicuous by its absence."] C. M. BakewelL ' The Issue between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism.' [Questions Dewev's use of 'immediate' in II. 22.] II. 26. F. C. French. 'The Relation of Psychology to the Philosophy of Religion.' [Criticises James, because ' subjective miracle is quite as impossible as objective miracle,' but rests on the assumption that if religious experiences have cognitive value their object must be ' supernatural '.] J. Dewey. ' The Knowledge Experience Again.' [Reply to Bode and Bakewell : II. 24, 25. "Even the dis- tinctively logical experience is still always in toto an immediate experi- ence."] W. H. Sheldon. ' Universals : a Reply ' [to Pitkin : II. 22]. III. 1. W. E. Hocking. ' The Transcendence of Knowledge.' [" This world beyond is not a fixed order : these kinds of experience seem to a certain extent to play the role of world beyond for each other, so that cognitive experience is known by value experience, and value experience in turn by cognition."] I. A. Leighton. ' Psychology, and the Logical Judg- ment with Reference to Realism.' ["The reality of abstract truths is a thought-reality, but not a mere psychological existence."] New York Academy of Science (Report). There is also an interesting review of a book by Schultz arguing that the Greeks were blue-yellow colour blind. III. 2. H. K. Marshall. ' The Nature of Feeling.' [Distinguishes five senses of the term and derives them from a common f subjective- ness'.] J. Dewey. 'The Terms Conscious and Consciousness.' [Dis- cusses six senses of the term.] Discussions. P. Hughes, W. T. Bush, J. B. Miner. III. 3. H. N. Gardiner. ' The Definition of Feeling.' [A feeling is any content of consciousness regarded as the immediate present modification of an individual experience.] M. F. Washburn. ' The Term " Feeling ".' H. Nicholas. ' Prof essor James's " Hole ".' [The notion of ' continuous transitions ' in ' pure experience ' does not effect a transition from a solipsistic to a ' common ' experience. ] Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. III. 4. F. C. S. Schiller. 'Is Absolute Idealism Solipsistic ? ' [A paper that should provoke a good deal of discussion and disclaimer. It "contains implications which reduce it to a choice between solipsism and suicide," and concludes that " possibly neither philosophy nor theology would suffer irreparable loss by the self-elimination of absolute idealism ".] 15. Tausch. ' The In- terpretation of a System from the Point of View of Developmental Psychology.' [A typical instance of the cumbrous titles which are allowed to disfigure this ' Journal '. The paper is really a criticism of an amateur philosopher named C. K. Franklin.] J. W. Baird. ' A Reply to Dr. Miner.' [C/. III. 2.]