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II. THE NEW REALISM AND THE OLD IDEALISM. 1 BY J. S. MACKENZIE. THE title of this paper is somewhat ambiguous, since the term ' Realism ' is commonly used in two quite distinct senses as the antithesis of Idealism and as the antithesis of Nominalism. It happens, however, that the recent move- ment of thought that I have now in mind has a tendency to be realistic in both senses of the word. The writers to whom I refer treat all the objects that come before our consciousness all ' ideas ' in the wide Lockeian sense of the term as containing or having a reality independent of the consciousness to which they are presented ; and among these ideas those that Locke calls ' abstract general ideas ' are included. In fact, the school of thought to which I refer is the direct antithesis of that of Berkeley, with regard both to his subjectivism and to his nominalism. 2 The only important point on which it agrees with Berkeley is in the contention that the Lockeian distinction between primary and secondary qualities cannot be maintained as ultimate. Before proceeding to consider this point of view more par- ticularly, it may be well to make some general remarks on the significance of the movement that it represents. A generation ago the tendency was for all serious specula- 1 An address to Philosophical Societies at Cardiff, Birmingham and Glasgow. I have thought it best to leave this paper in the form of a lecture, as it does not claim to be a systematic discussion, but only a suggestion of points for consideration. 2 This may seem to be contradicted by the fact that some of the lead- ing supporters of the new Realism (especially Mr. Moore and Mr. Eussell) connect it with an extremely nominalistic type of Logic, like that of Antisthenes. This Logic, however, seems to be quite capable of recog- nising types such as those of Plato. What it really excludes is not the Platonic theory of Ideas, but only that particular aspect of it which is expressed by the term Koii/tovi'a. With this logical aspect of the new Realism I do not deal in the present paper. For a somewhat searching discussion of it, I-may refer to the very valuable little book by Mr. H. H. Joachim on TJie Nature of Truth, chap. ii.