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THE NEW EEALISM AND THE OLD IDEALISM. 311 sising a point that is to be found in Kant ; but it is one that is found only in the second edition of his Critique, and one that he never quite succeeded in making clear, and that most succeeding idealists have perhaps not sufficiently ap- propriated. I believe that the attempt to understand this point may lead us to a truer conception of what Idealism properly means. The new Eealism may seem at first sight to convinced idealists like Protection in economics to be a return to an exploded superstition. It may seem to be merely the revival of a crude materialism, like that which prevailed among the early Greek philosophers, before any real epistemological reflexion had set in ; or of the somewhat more refined conception of matter that we find among the early Car- tesians, or in the so-called philosophy of Common Sense. But further reflexion will, I think, convince us that it is no mere revival of past errors, nor even simply a new error, but an attempt to deal with a genuine difficulty, in the form in which it is presented by recent idealistic speculation. It, is directed against subjective Idealism ; and its real value is to be found in what may, I trust, prove to be the final laying; of that obdurate spectre. There are many recent writers who have sought to de- velop a realistic doctrine in the sense that I am now seeking to indicate. I might instance the profound (if somewhat tantalising) discussions of Adamson, or the more recent papers by Profs. Stout l and Alexander ; and I believe that a great deal of what has been said, especially by the last two, is traceable, directly or indirectly, to the very able and suggestive writings of Avenarius. But there is no one who seems to me to have put the main points with more clearness, directness, and force and certainly none who has pushed them more ruthlessly to their conclusion than Mr. G. E. Moore; and in what follows I have his statement of the case more directly in mind than that of any one else. 2 It is not my intention, however, to follow his arguments closely. My object is not to criticise any particular writer, but rather to bring out what seems to me important and valuable in the general view to which I refer. 1 Prof. Stout has, as I think, both stated the realistic position in its most itellifjible form and also indicated most successfully how it can be sconciled with idealism. 2 His Refutation of Idealism is what I have chiefly in view, but I lave also made use of his Principia Ethica, nor have I been entirely un- lindful of some applications of his ideas by Mr. Kussell in his Philo- ohy of Leibniz and in his Principles of Mathematics.