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-324 J. s. MACKENZIE : far as I can see, there is no other kind of interpretation that does enable us to do this. This point, however, connects very closely with the second objection to idealism to which I have already referred. Mr. Moore and some others seem to think that idealism is open to objection on the ground that it is fundamentally para- doxical ; and that some sort of realism is to be preferred to it on this account. Idealism, as Mr. Moore says, " is certainly meant to assert (1) that the universe is very different indeed from what it seems, and (2) that it has quite a large number of properties which it does not seem to have. Chairs and tables and mountains seem to be very different from us ; but, when the whole universe is de- clared to be spiritual, it is certainly meant to assert that they are far more like us than we think. . . . When we say it is spiritual we mean to say that it has quite a number of excellent qualities, very different from any which w T e commonly attribute either to stars or planets or to cups and saucers." Now, if the contention that idealism is paradoxical merely means that it leads us to some new and unexpected conclusions, this can hardly be an objection to a philosophical theory ; and of course Mr. Moore does not mean to imply that it is. But if it means that some aspects of our experience are made unintelligible by it and this, I think, is what he wishes to suggest then certainly the objection is a very serious one indeed, and brings us back to the point that we have just been considering. Now, in what way can it be urged that idealism has this result ? When we ask, what are the paradoxical conclusions to which idealism points, we generally find, I think, that they arise from confounding idealism with subjectivism. Berke- ley's view at least in his earlier statement of it is, I think, really paradoxical. It does make it almost impossible pro- bably quite impossible to give an intelligible account of the material system as we know it. But idealism, in the more objective sense, is certainly not open to this objection. For what is it that objective idealism asks us to believe ? Mr. Moore and some others seem, to think that idealism asks us, as Hegel put it, to stand on our heads and view the world all topsy-turvy. There is surely no foundation for this. It is a sort of view that is sometimes put forward about physical science, as well as about idealism. Mr. Balfour, for instance our modern Gorgias in his well- known address to the British Association, referred pathet- ically to the way in which the physicist shows that our ordinary life is passed in a world of illusion. Of course ihere is some truth in this. But surely it is only true in