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E. WESTEBMABCK, Origin and Development of Moral Ideas. 403 3p respect and gratitude. I do so, however, with a lingering doubt as to the precise philosophical principles upon which the writer bases his Theism. He speaks many weighty words on be- If of the claim of Reason to say the last word, and appears at times regard himself as a loyal intellectualist. But many will charge him with separating an autonomous Faith from Eeason, and making the gulf between them all but impassable ; and for myself, I should say that it is in an ethical teleology, like Kant's, that he finally ists anchor. H. E. MACKINTOSH. 'he Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas. By EDWARD WESTEBMABCK, Ph.D. Vol. I. London : Macmillan & Co., 1906. Pp. xxi, 716. )B. WESTEBMABCK'S work fills me with profound admiration as >ne who has long groped about in the same field of research and ilmost lost the hope of reducing the facts to order. There is no )ok in any language that deals concretely with the evolution of lorality on so grand a scale or in so authoritative a way. I had therefore far rather spend my time on a digest than on a critical notice ; and am fully aware of the futility of offering a criticism made ere the digest a matter perhaps of months is complete. As it is, having thus in general terms acknowledged my sense of the immense importance of the treatise as a whole, I shall confine myself to bringing forward a few objections, I hope not captious, certain aspects of what might be called its philosophic back- ground. Such objections should be raised, if anywhere, in MIND. Even if well grounded, however, they are not serious enough to detract perceptibly from the impressiveness of this rich and crowded canvas. In what follows I shall concern myself solely with the first half of the book, wherein first principles are set forth. The second half, which studies in detail the more impor- tant modes of human conduct as far as regards one group thereof (five other groups remaining over to be investigated in a second volume), I may have an opportunity of discussing elsewhere. Dr. Westermarck at the very outset defines his position as an ethical philosopher. His is an " ethical subjectivism ". The objectivity of moral judgments is a chimera. There are no general moral truths. Nothing can be said to be truly right or wrong. In the last resort our moral standard is a personal one. " My moral judgments are my own judgments ; they spring from my own moral consciousness ; they judge of the conduct of other men not from their point of view, but from mine, not with primary refer- ence to their opinions about right and wrong, but with reference to my own." Why do I pronounce these judgments ? Because I am what I am. " Our moral consciousness belongs to our mental constitution, which we cannot change as we please. We approve