Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/429

HANS EAEDEB, Platons Philosophische Entwickelung. 415 supports him : he holds that things, as opposed to their qualities, are really perceived. But even the qualities cannot be wholly- subjective, or how should we distinguish a piece of chalk from an. inkpot? Here, in addition to "evident presumptions," a notion of inexactitude is called in aid (p. 96) : it is contended that one content may apprehend several different objects, though inexactly. ?hus it becomes possible that the object of an aspection of colour (say) really is a quality of the thing, but that the same content light have as object a different quality of a thing. Thus not only things, but qualities, will be more or less perceived : in such cases )f inexactitude, we may speak of /^//-perceptions. There are len two objects, one phenomenal and one noumenal ; "naive realism" takes the former for the latter (p. 98). It seems to be leld though this is not clearly said that by means of this lotion of inexactitude we can maintain, e.g., that things do really lave colours, but not exactly the colours they seem to have. It ia irgued that half-perceptions in general give sufficient data for judgments of diversity or number ; and on this basis we can ac- )unt for the supposed greater objectivity of the primary qualities. 5ome phenomena are better evidence than others as to the abso- ite qualities of things : science is not concerned only with pheno- lena, and can hope to approximate to noumena by diminishing; le inexactitude of external aspections. It is a pity that the last section is not more explicit, and doea lot meet in detail the usual arguments, more or less sanctioned in action ii., against external perception. Moreover, the notion of lexactitude put forward is difficult to accept. It would seem as. though content and object were connected by a necessary relation )f a kind which excludes the possibility of different objects for one intent. The natural view of inexactitude is, surely, that the- >bject differs more or less from the object which really exists, not that the content is equally appropriate to several objects. Apart rein this rather difficult point, the book as a whole is a valuable )ntribution to a difficult subject, although it is, perhaps, a trifle optimistic in its conclusions. B. EUSSELL. Platons PkilosophiscJie Entivickdung. Von HANS EAEDER. Leipzig : Teubner, 1905. Pp. 435. M. 8. 1902 the Eoyal Danish Society of Sciences proposed as the subject for a philosophical prize essay " an investigation of the position which the most important dialogues occupy, both philo- Dphically and chronologically, among Plato's writings ". The results hitherto obtained were to be collected and arranged, and, possible, fresh results were to be reached on this basis. The resent volume is the result, and has been duly ' crowned '. The*