Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/51

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF PLAY. 37 iid not preparatory. I do not suggest that the game is arried on for the activities it involves, but that success in ,he game is the object aimed at ; not activity for its own ake, but the game for its own sake. Psychologically, omitting, as far as may be, all reference to that larger grasp which impels us to philosophic definition, how shall we characterise play ? Where shall we find play in its most easily distinguishable forms ? The answer would seem to be, "In its most highly developed forms". And, bearing in mind that ' play ' is a correlative term to ' work/ we shall do well to look for the characteristics of play where it is most clearly and consciously distinguished from work. It remains briefly to touch upon the various philosophical standpoints from which play may be regarded. We may onsider it teleologically, as defined by its purpose, considered om the outside, in the same way as we ascribe purpose to stinctive action. Such a view is that of Prof. Groos. The essence of play with him is its quality of practice or preparation. This view may be compared with the biological one which regards ' play ' as a functioning of the immature but ripening organs subserving the life functions of the adult individual. Sharply contrasted with this doctrine is the recapitulation theory. The work of the fathers becomes the play of the children, and ' play ' is rather the exercise of organs tending to relative decline. This section will have served its purpose if it prevents useless logomachy through a non-recognition of the varying standpoints from which the question is discussed. III. PSYCHOLOGY OF PLAY (i.) Taking the individualistic standpoint proper to psychology it is, I think, commonly agreed : 1. That those activities are playful which are performed for the sake of the game ; we play for the " game " not the" cup ". 2. That in so far as the conscious acquisition of skill, either in the game or in anything else, is present, the mental atti- ide to that extent ceases to be a purery playful one. We ilk, for example, of practising and playing the piano, and 7e mean two distinct things, we practise to play rather than )lay for practice. 3. That the ' plays ' of life are more or less dissociated com the great body of belief and action which make up the jonception of our real world ; one is belief which is made, the other is make-believe. So far, there would, I think, be little disagreement, but irther specification does bring difficulty.