Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/545

THE NATUEE OF TEUTH. 531 a simple eternal entity, and then go on to maintain that this simple self -identical entity is both in my pocket and in yours, and also in no place and at no time, I can only protest that a simplicity of this kind is too deep for me to fathom. Nor does it make the least difference if you call your simple entity a 'universal'. And if, finally, you insist that the relation of the simple entity to the points of Space which are my pocket, is 'precisely and numerically the same ' as its relation to the points of Space which are your pocket, I must admit that I am unable to distinguish a ' precise numerical identity ' of this kind from numerical diversity " (p. 48). I have quoted this paragraph in full, because it contains the whole of what Mr. Joachim has to say on the fundamental question at issue. 1 He passes on immediately to other views, considering the view in question sufficiently refuted. Before considering the main point, it seems necessary to clear up two misunderstandings. First, I should not say that a penny in your pocket was the same as a penny in mine, unless it was the same penny, i.e., unless you had taken it out and given it to me. For a penny is a piece of matter, and its identity consists in being composed of the same particles. But the qualities in virtue of which we call it a penny (qualities which it may lose without losing its material identity) are, I should say, numerically the same in so far as they are not different qualitatively. Secondly, I do not maintain that greenness (e.g.), is " also in no place and at no time ". I maintain that greenness can be considered without regard to the spaces and times in which it is, and that in so considering it we do not alter it; i.e., it is possible in thought to isolate it, and in so doing we merely disregard its relations without in any way mutilat- ing it itself. Coming now to the main question, what is the essence of Mr. Joachim's contention? "In this account, ... I can see nothing but a statement of the problem." "A simplicity of this kind is too deep for me to fathom." "I am unable to distinguish a 'precise numerical identity' of this kind from numerical diversity." The difficulty is that none of these are of the nature of arguments. They are simply statements as to what Mr. Joachim can or cannot imagine. It is, of course, implied that what he cannot imagine is nothing ; but this can hardly be taken to be one of the fundamental premisses of all philosophy. The importance of the point is very great ; for, except certain historical portions, and a few paragraphs at the end in which fundamental doubts are discussed, there is hardly anything in the book which does not assume that all the constituents of a complex must be complex. It seems a pity, 1 There is also a note, p. 47 n, which offers me a dilemma ; but this provides no argument, since the second horn of the dilemma (which is the one I accept) is refuted merely by the question : " How can it [greenness] a simple numerically identical entity enter into different existent complexes " ? No attempt is made to show that it cannot : t* impossibility is regarded as self-evident.