Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/89

PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 75 but a complex secondary presentation which at times takes the form which leads me to say that I have the representa- tion of the primary presentation " the watch ". Now, in such a case, what I really have in attention in the second moment is a complex secondary presentation of triple emphasis in which two parts appear especially prominent. If I use A as the symbol of the primary presentation " my watch in my hand " : then, in the moment when I have the secondary presentation which leads me to say " this is a re- presentation of the perception of the watch when it was in my hand," this secondary presentation is of the following nature. 1. A partial secondary presentation which is commonly called the representation of A ; and which I may designate by the symbol a. 2. A partial secondary presentation which is what I call " what A was " ; and which I may designate by the symbol a. 3. A sense of relation which leads me to say that a and H are alike. The primary presentation A no longer exists. What does exist is two partial secondary presentations, a (the so-called representation of A), and H ("what A was"); both within one complex secondary presentation. These two partial secondary presentations a and H I compare ; and I think of a (the so-called representation of A) as so far like H (" what A was ") that a is almost com- pletely identified with H ; and a (the so-called representa- tion of A) is said to be almost exactly H (" what A was "). It is evident here that we are dealing in the first place with the comparison of differents, and not with anything like identities. And it is clear in the second place that the a and the H with which we are dealing are widely different from A ; for A was a primary presentation, while a and H are clearly secondary presentations. It is also clear that a and H differ widely, although they are both parts of a complex secondary presentation. For a (the so-called " representation " of the non-existent A) may be, and often is, what we have above called a primary- memory-image, a secondary presentation which seems to be almost primary in its character ; or it may be just as far as possible from such a primary-memory-image. That is to say a may differ widely in its character of nearness and vividness and fulness. But such is not the case with H (what A was). It can never acquire the primary characteristics of the primary-