Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/107

ETHICS FROM A PURELY PRACTICAL STANDPOINT. 91 well to state these theories in terras of " pleasure " and " system " respectively, and to avoid such question-begging terms as "happi- ness," " well-being " and " welfare" which are used by both indifferently. Mrs. Bain is apparently unaware of this ambiguity and uses " well-being " as though it were clearly synonymous with greatest pleasure. The question that Mrs. Bain proposes is, Which of these theories is the more effective, first as a guide, second as a motive, to desirable conduct ? To the Utilitarian the interest of her paper will consist not as she seems to suppose in the originality of her question but in the heresy of her answer. J. S. Mill as everybody knows was led by his personal experience to maintain that from the point of view of individual happiness it was not desirable to cultivate the habit of considering conduct from the hedonistic point of view. The best practical results were in his opinion to be obtained by avoiding the use of the pleasure calculus, and pursuing objective interests as though they had a value on their own account. Mr. Spencer may be said to have extended this " paradox of Hedonism " to the sphere of politics and an altruistic conduct in general. He tries to show that here also the best results are obtained by setting before ourselves and others not the production of happiness as the immediate object, but the maintenance of the conditions of life. Professor Sidgwick to this extent agrees with both that he is never tired of emphasising the difficulties that beset the attempt to form a direct estimate of pleasures and pains, and the undesirability of relying on a purely utilitarian morality. Undeterred by these authorities Mrs. Bain proposes to revert to the claim of primitive Utilitarianism that " greatest pleasure " is not only an accurate guide but an effective motive to desirable conduct. Leaving Utilitarians to settle this difference among themselves, the critic of Utilitarianism will find in Mrs. Bain's contention a welcome simplification of the issue. In discussing the practical difficulties of the theory as a guide to conduct and a basis of appeal he has hitherto felt himself handicapped by the admissions of its own supporters. Whatever he said on the difficulties of striking a balance of pains and pleasures the Utilitarian himself was always prepared to go one better in the same direction. And when he pointed to the ineffectiveness of the appeal to self-interest or others' happiness, he was met by the rejoinder that Utilitarians don't appeal to them. But here he will feel is a plain issue. Is the theory as unworkable in practice as he holds it to be untenable in theory? To further simplify the question we may here leave out all reference to the difficulties that beset the attempt to estimate hedonic consequences with any degree of accuracy. I doubt very much whether any one who has realised the force of the considera- tions put forward by Professor Sidgwick and others will find in the few sentences Mrs. Bain devotes to this subject an adequate reply to them.