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SOME PROBLEMS OF CONCEPTION. 161 VII. Deduction and the Essence. There is indeed one aspect in which the organic universal appears as a basis of formal deduction. If we take it as a disjunctive scheme in which the alternative modifications of each item are taken as known, it may, as above hinted, be used as a basal principle from which the specific forms can be deduced. We have here the Aristotelian ideal of science. We start with the generic essence, the primary special principle which states the ri <TTI of the yevos, while it also assumes the real existence of something corresponding to its terms (the o ri e'er). This generic essence contains several elements (TO, v TU> ri eari KaTTjyopov/Aeva 1 ), and each of these in its turn admits of further definition. Each of these definitions will contain several elements, and through the mediation of the term defined these are all shown to be attributable to the generic conception. They are in fact the TrdOr) which are thus proved /caO' avro of the ultimate 76^09. This is why a science can, and according to Aristotle should, proceed through definition. 2 Thus to illustrate from the Ethics (though that is not strictly an aTroSet/crt/cr/ eTrtem^w/) ' happi- ness ' must be assumed as an actual end for man, and must be defined as an activity of the soul in excellence. Here we have the U7ro$ecu9 laying down the existence of our general subject-matter and defining its essence. Then taking up the points of the definition, activity, soul and excellence may all be further defined. Whatever enters into their definition will become an element in the general conception of Happiness. And the various elements in the definition of excellence, et9, Trpoaipea-is, ^ea-orrj^, etc., will all be susceptible of further definitions which will in turn admit of the same treatment, until in <f>p6vrjcris (which here replaces &runi}pi?) we have the complete system of reasoning which connects our general principle with the various occasions of conduct as they arise. This theory must be criticised, not as an account of the growth of science, but as a conception of its structure when complete. From this point of view we may say two things. First, the theory of the organic universal tends to justify the conception of essence as such, and in particular the relation of genus and species indicated by the Aristotelian theory. For the common principle is the generic essence, and it contains the elements which in their various modifications produce the specific forms. And so far as we look at a subject in 1 See, e.g., Post. Anal., i., 22, p. 82, b. 37. " nacrai al eirurrrmai St' opHTfiov yLyvovrat. Post. Anal., ii., 17, p. 99, a. 22 t 11