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SOME PKOBLEMS OF CONCEPTION. 163 These modifications could not be turned into the central point, but are naturally of a secondary order. In some degree they may be referable to the essence as such, and so far as this is the case we get a detachable and self-centred field of knowledge. 1 But in the main they with their various properties are the effects of interaction. Each essence is, so to say, a centre of force, but the phenomena are mainly visible in the field between the centres. The distinction, then, of the two species of the Universal is no less important for knowledge in general than for the theory of the concept in particular. Disjunctive classifica- tion and syllogistic deduction are associated with the one, while the other stands in close relation to ' Natural ' Classi- fications and the concrete methods of artistic presentation. And we have now seen that the conception of Essence with its historical associations which threatens to disappear under the one regime has an important sphere of influence under the other. Further problems arising in relation to the dis- tinction must be excluded from the scope of the present paper. 1 If any property is referable to the essence strictly as such, i.e. with no further condition, there could be no real reason for excluding it from the essence. Hence, apart from the idea of value the distinction of essence and property would vanish. Thus there appear to be two cases in which the term essence has real meaning: (1) when it is the generic principle opposed to specific modifications, and (2) when it is the substantial character, opposed to varying states, a case which does not concern this paper. We should hardly allow, as a third case, the structural principle of a totality as distinguished from the elements of which it is composed. For either elements and principle imply one another, in which case both are of the essence ; or they do not, and then we have one or other of the former cases. Or the distinction is purely one of value.