Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/190

174 .1. ELLIS MCTAGGAET : realised to be the real nature of the thing, and not merely an external appendage, is the Universal Notion as Such. THE PABTICULAE NOTION AS SUCH. It is, however, obvious, that this is only one side of the truth. If we found that everything must have some quality in common with everything else, we also found that no two things could have exactly the same qualities. And so, if we express the nature of A and B, in part, by pointing out that they have the common quality X, we are able to assert that it must also be the case that A possesses some quality M, not shared by B, and that B possesses some quality N, not shared by A. These qualities which distinguish the two things united in their possession of X, are what Hegel calls Particular Notions as Such. We see from this that no Notions are in themselves (at this stage) either Universal or Particular. The qualities M will be shared by A with other things, for example, C and D, and could have been made a Universal, with X under it as a Particular. For example, if we decide to classify a gallery of pictures by their painters, we may bring two pictures together as both painted by Raphael. They may be distinguished from one another, again, by one having a good frame and the other a bad one. Here "painted by Raphael" is the Universal, "having a good frame," and "having a bad frame," are the Particulars. But it would be possible, from caprice, or in preparing instructions for a frame-maker, to class pictures primarily by the condition of their frames. The first Raphael might then find itself separated from its companion and classed with a Velasquez. The Universal would here be "having a good frame," and the Particulars " painted by Raphael," and " painted by Velasquez ". This brings out the contingency which earns this part of the dialectic the name of Subjective. According to this category, any one classification, of the innumerable classi- fications possible, is as good as another. Any two things can be brought into the same class for no two things are destitute of some common quality. Any two things can be separated for no two things are without some difference in their qualities. There is no distinction made here between a classification based on deep and permanent similarities, and one based on trivial and temporary similarities. There is no criterion even of the fitness or unfitness of the classi- fication for any special purpose we may have in hand. Our choice of a Universal must be purely capricious.