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VON JUL. BERGMANN, Die Grundprobleme der Logik. 253 other for the solution of its own problem. The problem of Logic cannot be solved without the help of Metaphysics. For Logic aims at a knowledge of the correct and normative forms of thought ; but only those forms can be correct which correspond to the content of thought ; hence in order to know them, it is necessary to understand them in their relation to Being, to the object of thought ; and this can only be done by help of the Science of Being, i.e., of Metaphysics. And conversely, Meta- physics depends just as much upon Logic and cannot be treated in isolation from it, for Being is but the presupposition and raw material of knowledge, and cannot be comprehended apart from Knowledge." Of what is ordinarily called Material or Inductive Logic, the author can hardly be said to treat, as it only comes in for a very cursory discussion along with Probability, Analysis and Analogy in 33, with occasional isolated references elsewhere, as when he says (p. 139) that the only really fallacious Immediate Infer- ences are those called Formal. " The problem of Inference," it is observed by Mr. Bernard Bosanquet, " is something of a paradox. Inference consists in asserting as fact or truth, on the ground of certain given facts or truths, something which is not included in those data. We have not got inference unless the conclusion (i.) is necessary from the premisses, and (ii.) goes beyond the premisses. To put the para- dox quite roughly we have not got inference unless the con- clusion is (i.) in the premisses, and (ii.) outside the premisses." This problem lies at the very heart of Logic, and the problem of differentiation in unity which meets us in the theory of Judg- ment is in essence the same. The present book of Dr. Berg- mann's may be described as a gallant attempt to overcome the paradox indicated, in the various forms in which it appears in logical theory. This comes out in his treatment of Judgment as contrasted with Idea or Concept (he treats Vorstellung and Begriff as synony- mous) in his distinction between Affirmative and Negative Judg- ments, in his Division of Judgments and very strikingly in his account of Analytic and Synthetic Judgments, and of Immediate Inferences. We find again the same effort after a true unification in his discussion of the Principle of Ground, and its relation to the Laws of Thought and other fundamental logical laws, and in his view of Mediate Inference. And it is the same aim which animates his strenuous and re- peated efforts (in 8, 19, 26) to unify Thought and Existence, by exhibiting Knowledge ( = Truth) as Thought which has been guaranteed by an appeal to Being. It is not of course possible within the limits of this notice to discuss Dr. Bergmann's views on all these points, or others to which, in his short preface, he makes special reference. I have selected a few of them for examination.