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VON JUL. BERGMANN, Die Grundprobleme der Logik. 255 taneous but contrasted; but if of affirmation and negation one is psychologically or historically prior to the other, I would suggest that it is negation and not affirmation that is primary. Before I can say S is P I must have distinguished S qua S from P qua P, so that S 'is P must have been preceded by S (qud S) is not P (qua P). It appears that S is P and S is not P deal with different orders of relation. In S is P there is one ' object ' before the mind to which the two determinations or ideas are referred. S and P are in a certain way contrasted, and the unity of conjunction in one thing or object is attributed to them. In S is not P, on the other hand, not merely is there a contrast or comparison, but it is a contrast between two mutually exclusive objects. There are two ' ideas ' in this case too, but they are distinguished not merely as ideas or determinations, but also as being assigned to different things. This is not That, might be supposed to be the original form of negative judgment, and exhibits clearly enough its essential character as the simplest of relative judgments. And it is not only presumably primary, but is implicated, throughout our con- sciousness, in that distinction of things from one another which is necessary for the apprehension of system and even of mere plurality. No doubt, on further reflexion, further implications as that This and That belong to one world or whole and elabo- rate relations between negations and their corresponding affirma- tions, are arrived at but these we need not now consider. If we take the view that negative categoricals qud negatives are ' rela- tive' propositions, while affirmatives qud affirmatives are 'absolute,' we get an interesting starting point for the systematisation of all Propositions as Absolute or Kelative. Eeturning to Dr. Bergmann's view, we find that on the one hand between Concept (or Idea) and Predication, and on the other between Predication and Judgment Proper (which latter may be described as a judgment about a judgment), the line is not clearly drawn for if a predication is more than a concept, is it less than a judgment? and whatever may be the characteristics of judgment, if S is P is true expresses a judgment, does not S is P equally ex- press one ? Under the category of Judgments about judgments come Hypo- theticals and Disjunctives, and in most of the instances adduced of ampliative analytic judgments, the Predicate is an Immediate Inference from the Subject (e.tj., The line from a to & = the line from b to a) ; and Immediate Inferences and Categorical Syllo- gisms are easily shown to be naturally expressible as Hypo- thetical Propositions. And the blurring of the lines between the different groups is here not due to the practical obstacle of the occurrence of cases difficult to class precisely, but (I think) to the author's view of the fundamental unity between Idea (Concept), Predication, Judgment and Inference. What one does not feel