Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/274

258 CEITICAL NOTICES: On the other hand, in order to prove the truth of the sentences ' This apple is sweet,' ' This apple is not sweet,' by comparison with their object, it is not sufficient to contemplate in the object that which is signified by the designation ' This apple,' namely, the qualities on account of which I call a thing an apple, and the relation to me, the speaker, which is expressed by the word This ; I must add to these its taste [as sweet or not sweet] a characteristic which is neither common to all apples, nor contained in the relation expressed by the word This " (pp. 100, 101). That in such Judgments as 2 + 3 = 4 + 1 there is amplification need not be disputed, but whether such ought to be called Ana- lytic is another question. It is certain that the idea of 2 + 3 is not the idea of 4 + 1, and equally clear that whoever has before him 2 + 3 things, has therein what is numerically equal to 4 + 1. But it seems quite possible for a person to have arrived at count- ing 2 and 3 without having arrived at counting 4 as it is possible for him to have perceived that two sides of a triangle are equal, without having also perceived that that triangle must have the angles at the base equal ; though no doubt further examination of an isosceles reveals the further fact that it is, and must be, equal- angled, that the ' object,' in as far as it has the first property, must have the second. But the distinction and test by appeal to the ' object ' and comparison with it of the notion or idea, seems difficult ; for if the ' object ' is more or other than idea, then it would seem that in any case the whole object with all its proper- ties must be there, and any of its properties may be appealed to. On the other hand, if Gegenstand=Vorstellung or Begriff, the test seems arbitrary and ineffective. And the truth or untruth of Analytic Judgments is tested by reference to the ' real existence ' of their ' object '. But what exactly is to be understood by ' real existence,' and by what test can it be established in any given case ? The whole treatment of Sein and its bearing upon Truth is one of the most difficult and interesting portions of the book ; but I fear I must admit that it is likewise among the least satisfactory. It abounds however in close and penetrating thought, and is worthy of very careful consideration. The book is one which could not be read without both pleasure and profit by any thinker interested in logical and philosophical investigation ; at the same time it is difficult to do justice to it within the limits of a short notice. E. E. CONSTANCE JONES. L' Immanence de la Eaison dans la Connaissance Sensible. Par GE'DE'ON GOBY, Docteur es Lettres. Paris : Felix Alcan, 1896. Pp. 344. I MAY best indicate the author's main contention by contrasting with a truer view what seems to me to be its fundamental defect. '