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300 ALEXANDER F. SHAND : Propositions of the same form and in the same person ex- press both. They differ in only a single word, and the use of the word " shall" in the context of the one indicates that the meaning is a mere judgment, and the word " will " in the other, that the judgment contains also a volition. So also the disjunctive judgment, " I shall go either to Calais or Boulogne," contains a volition, while the -similar judgment, " I shall go or I shall not," is so pervaded by doubt as to exclude the possibility of will. We cannot then rely on the form of these judgments ; all depends on what they actually contain. And we can vaguely recognise two essential characters of this content. " If you are there I shall see you " is not will ; " If you are there I shall make a point of seeing you " is. In the one judg- ment there is an emphasis laid on the agency of the self which is wholly absent from the other. Yet, in other cases which also in a sense concern the self's agency, the hypothetical judgment expresses no more than expectation. " If I am tempted in that way I shall succumb " does not imply a present volition on my part to yield to temptation, but a mere expectation based on an experience of my own weakness. Yet in both judgments I affirm that I shall act in a certain way on the supposition of some event occurring. The other essential character of will has been brought out by our study of the disjunctive judgment. That judgment is always affected by doubt at a point, and is, in this sense, problematic : but where it contains volition there is always a core of belief. It is difficult to point out this core of belief, for it is to the fact of volition that it essentially refers ; and if we cannot point out the volition in the complex psychosis which contains it, we cannot specify the belief. This belief is not always that I shall accomplish what I intend ; for I may be doubtful of success. It is not essentially a belief that I shall do anything ; for my volition may rest on a supposal ; nor even that I shall try to do something, for this also may rest on a supposal. But unless I believe, unless I am aware for the belief is a judgment that, conditionally or un- conditionally, I shall try to do something, there can be no will. IV. FICTITIOUS CHOICE. We may draw the line between conation and will where the former divides into two contrary tendencies, each carrying an idea of its end. We may maintain that we cannot be said to will, and can have no sense of freedom where there is not