Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/321

TYPES OF WILL. 305 (3) The case of the youth in easy circumstances and free to do as he likes who is resolved to choose that profession for which his inclination is strongest, yet in doubt as to which is his strongest inclination, differs in a material respect from both the preceding types. Here there is a genuine conflict of desires. Different manners of life alternately appeal to him. Each awakens a strong desire. He hesitates for long be- tween them ; for the most intense may not be the most per- sistent. At length, after many contrary opinions, he reaches the momentous choice which decides his career. There is surely nothing fictitious about this choice ! Where could we find one more real to oppose to it ? Yet, as in the first type, he starts from a volition, and the conflict of opinion which follows is instrumental to it. The rival desires are not motives to his will which is already decided, but motives to his thought which has to decide which of them is the stronger. And this decision or choice is obviously a judg- ment, and the volition to which it is subordinate remains essentially what it was at the beginning. Its end has indeed changed, and through the process of thought has become more definite. At first it was, " I will adopt that profession which . . . " ; now it is, "I will adopt this profession ". But if at the beginning it were simple as a volition, it is simple now ; if it were a choice, it remains a choice. And the decision between the conflicting desires is the fictitious choice of judgment. Conflicting desires are in a right sense only motives to the will, where the will is the outcome of their conflict. Where it precedes and subordinates them, they are not its motives. Our resolutions are sometimes followed by the desire that we had not made them. But if we remain steadfast the desire is not a motive, and no more than an "obstacle " or hindrance. Where it unsettles the will and throws us anew into the state of doubt from which we had escaped, it is still not a motive to that volition, but to the new volition which tends to replace it. If the youth had asked, " After all, is it not wiser to set aside my inclinations and adopt that pro- fession which offers me solid advantages?" in that case, if his resolution had given way, there would have ensued a genuine conflict of motives. Torn between his preference for one mode of life and the love of wealth or position directing him to another, he would have been forced to choose be- tween these conflicting motives or to remain undecided. (4) We come next to the fourth type : the case of the child who is called upon to choose between two playthings. If the child ask itself which plaything is nicer, and ask itself no 20