It should be noticed first of all that Plato is careful to
mark the intimate connexion of the present argument with
the great second hypothesis by reverting here, and here only,
to the principle which had been laid down in 3, the annexe
and continuation of 2. That principle is once more, for the
second and last time in the dialogue, affirmed at 162 B. The
One, we began by assuming, "is not"; that is, it can have
negative predicates, and so is not the only reality : also, as
we have seen, "it is"; that is, because you can say something
negatively you must also be able to say something positively
about it. Thus, it " partakes " both of being and not-being.
Consequently, just as was argued at 155 E-156 A, these two
complementary sides of its full nature will fall apart in time.
It will, in fact, change. And change is movement ((Greek characters)). "The One" is thus once more shown to be the
exact reverse of that "moveless and changeless holy image"
of Eleatic and Megarian adoration ; its life, far from being
an unbroken eternity of empty self-sameness, involves the
repeated transition from affirmation to negation, from felt
and present unity to an existence which, while still real, is
to perception lost and suspended in indefinite plurality. In
experience it is sometimes the unity of the system, but also
sometimes the immense variety and complexity of its parts,
which obtrudes itself upon our notice. And yet there is
also a sense in which we may deny all we have just affirmed.
For the One not only is, but, by hypothesis, it also is not.
Not only, that is, is the one reality that which makes itself
known to us in every moment of our experience ; it is also
that which is never and at no moment in its fulness present
to us. And viewed in this light it is one and changeless.
For it (a) is nowhere, and consequently cannot undergo
change of place ; and (b) it is not contained in anything
((
Greek characters), 162 D), and consequently cannot rotate. Nor (c) can the One, regarded as
the ultimate unity of all things, know qualitative change;
were it to alter its character it would no longer be the One.
Thus we may assert with equal right (a) the one reality
includes change and motion ; (b) the one reality is changeless
and motionless (163 A). Becoming and decay will, of course,
follow the fate and share the fortunes of change and motion.
So that finally the " One," even though we attach negative
predicates to it, may be said in one sense to experience, in
another sense not to experience, becoming and decay. With
this result our demonstration is complete (163 B). We have
faced the difficulty which was already latent in 2, and shown
that the partial negation of the One which was there implied
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ON THE INTERPRETATION OF PLATO'S PARMENIDES.
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