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402 CRITICAL NOTICES : a way equally bold and excellent, not following the laboured and perplexing statement of its author, but presenting us with a well-digested and succinct account of what the latter was really concerned to teach. He commences with the " deductions," in- cluding not merely those of the Analytic but also those of the ^Esthetic ; giving us Kant's ' exposition ' of space and time as forms of sensibility, and, immediately afterwards, his deductions of the categories. He next (after a few paragraphs on phenomena .and things per se) presents us with Kant's criticism of speculative Philosophy (Pyschology, Cosmology, and Theology). Finally he exhibits Kant's relation to Natur-philosophie. Under these main headings Hoffding expounds for us the substance of the great Critique of Pure Reason. It would be superfluous, even if space allowed, to follow him in detail through this exposition. We who are accustomed to Caird's masterly presentation of Kant have become exacting in our demands of an expositor. The student will find in the broad outlines sketched by Hoffding evidence of a study as minute, penetrating and comprehensive as that made by Caird himself ; nor will he regard it as a fault that the former does not, like the latter, criticise Kant from a purely Hegelian standpoint. We must now draw attention to some of the strictures which Hoffding offers on the substance of the Kantian philosophy. It gave Kant great satisfaction to think that his table of forms or categories was complete. Hoffding, however, denies that such completeness is even attainable by Kant's analytical method. We can never be sure that we have enumerated all the " forms ". As little can we assure ourselves that in those enumerated we have reached the fundamental forms. Kant was under the impression that the Vernunftkritik could be effected once for all, not reflecting that every attempt at a critical philosophy must start from pre- suppositions of its own, which are in their way dogmatical and inevitably await their turn of criticism by some subsequent Vernunftkritik. Kant divides his categories into the mathematical and the dynamical groups. In fact, however, says Hoffding, the concepts of quantity and causality embrace all categories, being the two leading forms of the synthesis from which all knowledge springs. The familiar criticism of Kant's derivation of the categories from the forms of the judgment is repeated by Hoffding here. In reference to the derivation of the three Ideas from the forms of the syllogism, Hoffding remarks that it is still more forced than that of the categories from the forms of the judgment, being, indeed, baseless. Kant himself has shown, in his False Subtleti/ of the Syllogistic Figures, that the syllogism requires no other function of thought than that employed in the Judgment. Hence there is no need to give the ideas a root in reason separate from this. He is so far right, however, that the Ideas (soul, world, God) spring from the involuntary needs of consciousness to