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VIII. PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. v., No. 6. A. C. Fraser. ' Philosophical Faith.' [We have the philosophy of the unknowable, and that which makes infinite reality comprehensible by human thought. Both neglect the rationally authoritative needs of man. " ' Faith,' ' trust,' ' authority,' are words not unfit to designate the final relation of the human spirit to the universe of reality." Examination of Locke and Hegel. " Philo- sophical faith is the truly rational trust that nothing can happen in the temporal evolution which can finally put to confusion the principles of moral reason that are latent in man."] A. Seth. ' The Term " Natural- ism " in Recent Discussion.' [Defence of Balfour's usage.] D. G-. Ritchie. ' The Relation of Logic to Psychology,' i. [Psychology deals with events, logic with validity. Confusion of the two in Mill : discussion of the law of contradiction. No scientific line can be drawn between logic and epistemology : Jevons. The ultimate test of truth in all departments of knowledge is coherence within a system, and this test is identical with the ' laws of thought ' which underlie formal logic.] J. A. Leighton. ' Hegel's Conception of God.' [God is " the universal self-consciousness which comprehends within itself all concrete differences, men and things ".] Discussions. E. Ritchie. ' Professor Pfleiderer on Morality and Religion.' [Against Pfleiderer 's advocacy of the dependence of ethics on religious dogma.] C. W. Hodge. ' Windelband on the " Prin- ciple of Morality ".' [Windelband's teleological method requires a metaphysical supplement to ethics.] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. Vol. vi., No. 1. D. G-. Ritchie. 'The Relation of Logic to Psychology,' ii. [Judgment and concept ; intension and extension : singular and universal propositions ; the syllogism. Apology for Aristotelian and formal logic. General result : psychology ought to be kept out of logic, but cannot be kept out of the epistemology into which logic inevitably merges ; logic ought not to be kept out of psychology. The seeming paradox is explained by the fact that psychology is both philosophy and science of mind.] J. D. Logan. ' The Aristotelian Concept of (f>v<ris .' [Aristotle " transforms the early hylozoistic conception of (pvo-is as brute material will, determined in its ' appearances ' solely by its own caprice, into a new hylozoism, accord- ing to which the unconscious will of the world, determined in its ' appearances ' by and for immanent entelechies, is ultimately deter- mined by and for a spiritual being, a transcendent absolute entelechy, or supreme good ".] J. Dewey. ' The Psychology of Effort.' [There are three theories of effort : the spiritual, the sensational and the mixed. The difference is probably reducible to a confusion between effort as conscious fact and effort as logical category or moral value. In conscious effort certain sense qualities, usually fused, fall apai - t. The importance of effort is "due to the fact that it is the critical point of progress in action, arising whenever old habits are in process of recon- struction, or of adaptation to new conditions".] W. J. Wright. ' Lotze's Monism.' F. C. S. Schiller. ' Reply.' [Criticism of the