Greek characters).
In the third place, when we speak of " having knowledge," we
must distinguish between the mere presence of a proposition in
consciousness and actual living grasp of a truth. In a state of
drunkenness or of imperfect understanding of any kind[1] a man
may have in his mind the words that express a practical rule for
him ; but they may be mere words to him and not part of his real
self ((Greek characters),§ 8). He may say " Drink is a curse," or
even " I have had enough now," while he goes on drinking. We
are clearly justified in applying the distinction here drawn between
verbal and real assent to both premises, major and minor, uni-
versal and singular. In § 13, 1147 b 9, Aristotle applies this
distinction specially to the minor premise. Thus §§ 7 and 8 seem
perfectly in place after § 6, which has introduced the reference to
the two kinds of premises : they are no mere duplicate of § 5, but
bring in a new distinction a different kind of distinction between
potentiality and actuality from that which is made in § 5. It may
indeed be admitted that the whole passage would seem neater and
more orderly, if 7 and 8 had been placed immediately after § 5, so
that the two similar sets of explanations came together. But
(even apart from the advantage in having §§ 7,8 after the distinction
of premises in § 6) I do not think it could be inferred that Aristotle
would have placed them so. If the canons of orderly exposition,
which some scholars apply to the Aristotelian writings, were ap-
plied to Kant's Critiques, these would require to be largely re-
written and great portions would have to be rejected as spurious.
Lastly, in §§ 9-11 we have the explanation of this inattention
or non-realisation of knowledge which in the preceding sections
has been shown to be the source of (Greek characters). In his final argument
Aristotle goes more fully into the actual facts the actual phe-
nomena of mind which take place in cases of (Greek characters). This is
to investigate the matter (Greek characters), as distinct from the more ab-
stract arguments which have preceded and which turn upon the
general distinctions between potential and actual knowing, be-
tween consciousness of a universal rule and consciousness of the
fully particularised application of it, between lip-service and real
assent. What is now given is a psychological analysis of the
mental state of the (Greek characters), but with the help of the logical analysis
of the syllogism. Aristotle has already recognised in Eth. Nic.,
- ↑ In connexion with§§ 7, 8, it is interesting to compare the passage in
Phys., 255 a 33, to which Prof. .T. Burnet has called my attention.
There two senses of (
Greek characters) are distinguished : (1) that of (Greek characters), (2) that of (Greek characters). The first of these senses is the
potential knowledge of § 5 of this chapter in the Ethics. Can we identify
the second with the unrealised knowledge of §§ 7, 8? The illustration
of en (Greek characters) in § 8 would seem to justify this identification.
Aristotle may mean that in states of "confused perception" (if we may
borrow Leibniz's phrase), like those of swoon, insanity, drunkenness, the
mind falls back into the condition of the beginner who has not yet waked
up to the meaning of the words he is made to repeat.
