Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/594

578 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. are natural and normative sciences. As the former, ethics discovers the causation of morality ; as the latter, its meaning. In both forms it is to be distinguished from the metaphysics of ethics. Illustrations (egoism and altruism, moral obligation) ; cautions (all scientific method the same; normative science does not transcend common sense).] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. iv., No. 2. L. Farrand. 'Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association.' J. H. Hyslop. ' Upright Vision.' [Touch associations must be ex- cluded. The eye movement theory is thus ruled out. We may accept a form of the projection theory, very like Le Conte's, except that the line of reference must be understood simply as a perpendicular to the sensing surface.] A. H. Lloyd. ' The Stages of Knowledge.' [Sen- sation as stimulus or undifferentiated continmun is rather the lower limit than the first stage of knowledge. The law of knowledge is the identity of internal motive and external stimulus. Knowledge is thus part of and means to active self-expression. It begins with positive sensation, obedient to the law of relativity ; and since self-expression is action, and action means control, spontaneity, and tension of the two (consciousness), that law becomes a law of objectivity, a principle of control, or (from the other side) a law of organic activity. Sensation rises to perception, "a process by which the past may be said to move over into the object and to abide there as an important phase of the present ". "The percept is not-self, but also the incarnate self." The self acting fluently in language enters the world of conception. The alleged fourth stage of knowledge, intuition, is again a limiting value : not self-expression, but the vital impulse thereto fully mediated in an act.] Discussion and Reports. G. T. Ladd. ' The President's Address.' [Critique of Fuller- ton.] G-. M. Stratton. ' Upright Vision and the Retinal Image.' [Reply to Hyslop.] N. Wilde. ' The Originality of Esthetic Feeling.' [Appreciation of Grosse.] Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes. Vol. iv., No. 3. A. T. Ormond. 'The Negative in Logic.' [In face of environment the primitive conscious organism experiences pulses of self-assertion. These are volitions, and are the central essence of judg- ment. Existential judgment implies the pulse plus an interesting re- presentation ; relational implies the existential universe plus competing alternatives within it. The judgment in general is derivative from pre- logical (psychological) experience. In an existential judgment the ' real ' subject asserts itself, pro the compatible (affirmative), contra the incom- patible (negative). Similarly in relational judgments: the 'real' subject is genus or universal within which affirmation or negation falls. Hence negation is not mediated by affirmation ; the two are co-ordinate (Aristotle). The progress of the ' real ' subject, however, is direct through the latter, indirect through the former. By function, negation simply removes ; though by implication it may be something positive. Critique of Benno Erdmann.] W. James. ' Contributions from the Harvard Psychological Laboratory.' I. L. M. Solomons. ' Discrimina- tion in Cutaneous Sensations.' [Judgments of twoness are due to simple association between the sensations from the two points and the idea of two points ; they do not necessarily vary with judgments of position, distance, area, etc.] n. E. A. Singer. ' Studies in Sensation and Judgment, (a) Differentiation of Sense Organs.' [Discreteness of end- organs of touch and cutaneous pain ; Goldscheider's work on temperature is generally reproducible.] (6) ' Intensity.' [Two blows, of different intensity, excite the knee-jerk : length of kick is available as secondary criterion of intensity. Two hypotheses : either direct association of