Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/84

68 ALICE JULIA HAMLIN : And (2) there is less real than apparent difference in defini- tions of impulse as voluntary or involuntary. Wuudt, for instance, denning impulse as " univocally determined action," calls it " voluntary " ; while many others, using the same definition, call it involuntary. " Voluntary " actions, with the latter, are restricted to acts of choice. I conclude, then, that the active element, whether called voluntary or not, is more prominent and unmistakable than the ideational element ; and pass on to the consideration of the affective element. 5. The Affective Element in Instinct: Instinct, Feeling and Emotion. I have unavoidably touched upon this topic in many preceding quotations bearing upon the relation of sensation and impulse to instinct. With the exception of those who deny that instinct is a conscious process, all the writers whom I have cited refer with more or less emphasis to the presence of pleasure and pain in instinct. There is, however, much difference in their estimate of the relation of feeling to the other elements present. Carpenter and Romanes hardly refer to the importance of pleasure and pain ; while Lehmann, Schneider and others make feeling " the foundation of all psychical life "- 1 Wundt and Hoffding do not regard feeling as thus fundamental, but still consider it a necessary constituent of instinct. So Wundt says "the interaction of external stimulus with affective and voluntary response constitutes the real nature of instinct at all stages of organic evolution ". 2 Bain makes feeling of great importance in his theories, since he maintains that pleasure increases vital energy, while pain lessens it. This fact, in his opinion, is what makes instinctive and im- pulsive action possible. We need not enter into the controversy upon the com- parative importance of feeling and will. We are more concerned to know just what is covered by the element of " feeling " in instinct. Some think of it as the tone of the exciting sensation (Bain and Volkmann). Sergi speaks of the pleasure or pain as the result of the instinctive action. Sully finds emotion, rather than mere feeling, present, and describes instinct as " a vague, undefined craving for some- thing, and a restless striving for its realisation ". 3 All three opinions are correct in many cases, emotions being present, I suppose, only in the instincts of the higher animals. 1 Schneider's Der thierische Wille, p. 85. 2 Human and Animal Psychology, tr., p. 409. 3 Sully 's The Human Mind, ii., 186.