Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/151

PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 137 view that "reality is definite, concrete experience ; not experience, i.e., but experiences. ... To say that all these experiences are brought to- gether in the unity of experience is either to make experience perfectly abstract or else it is simply an act of philosophic faith." Reality being given, in type, in conscious activity, thought is real (or is a representa- tion of reality) only as it is a reproduction of concrete activity. The process of judgment is analysed on the basis of this (Dewey's) theory, with especial reference to Bradley.] E. A. Singer. ' Sensation and the Datum of Science.' [Science is usually spoken of as constructing a world from the given : let us ask the counter-question, and try to construct the ' given ' from the ' world '. Various claimants appear ; sensation is a typical one. Examination shows, however, that it does not and cannot stand for an immediate datum of experience. Moreover, logical analysis of the problem proves that the current method of search leads to meaning- less results. The key to the situation lies in 'reconstruction'. "The starting-point for reconstruction we must indeed have ; but it is no simple datum for construction."] W. G-. Everett. ' The Concept of the Good.' [The Good is at once happiness and perfection : happiness, as ' subjective, affective, evaluative,' perfection, in its ' objective, ideational, constitutive aspect '. That there is no conflict is shown (1) by the verdict of experi- ence that the ' higher ' pleasures are quantitatively greater than the ' lower ' ; (2) by the two-sidedness of motivation of conduct ; and (3) by the appeal made to the two faces of the concept in deciding between certain alternatives of action. The only unity for the double-aspect good is the concrete moral personality, i.e., the very material which is to be analysed by moral science. Hence the ' dualism ' is a dualism of facts directly and organically interrelated.] Discussion. Cfr. H. Howison. ' The Real Issue in " The Conception of God " ' . [Against Royce. The author holds that " the world of truth [truth of fact and law as well as of value and conduct] springs . . . from the world of self-active intelli- gences ; presupposes and in its wholeness is a plurality of such strictly free minds, and cannot be contained in the unity of any single conscious- ness". Royce maintains the antithesis.] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. v., No. 5. M. W. Calkins. ' Short Studies in Memory and in Association from the Wellesley College Psycho- logical Laboratory.' [(lj Immediate and delayed recall of the concrete and the verbal. The author finds, as Kirkpatrick found, that the concrete is the better memory material, especially in delayed recall. ' Recalled ' and ' recalled in order ' give different values. (2) Tendency to mental combinations. A general characteristic, occurring with visual and audi- tory, verbal and concrete stimuli. Words combine better than pictures. (3) Associations with childhood experience. As against Galton's 39 per cent, childhood and 15 per cent, recent associations, students give 15 and 33 per cent., old and middle-aged persons 33 and 31 per cent.] R. Macdougal. ' Music Imagery : a Confession of Experience.' [The writer, not a good visualiser, records a series of vivid images which occurred during the hearing of a musical composition while he was in a state of fatigue and relief from tension. The derivation of some of the figures is traceable, as is their suggestion at the time by the music. The fact emphasised is that here the mood (organic sensations) mediated the visual imagery.] F.Kennedy. ' On the Experimental Investigation of Memory.' [A useful resume and bibliography of the experimental work on memory, with indication of lacunte.] Discussion and Reports. H. Muensterberg. ' Psychology and Education.' [Reply to Cattell.] C. L. Franklin. ' The New Cases of Total Colour Blindness.' [On Hess