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140 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. REVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE. No. 18. V. Ermoni (' Le Thomisme et les Resultats de la psychologic experiinentale ') maintains that while, on the one hand, ultra-spiritualism fails to account for cerebral phenomena, materialism, on the other, is in evident conflict with the phenomena of thought and consciousness ; that, in consequence, for ultra-spiritualism there can be no physiology, and for materialism there can be no psy- chology. The theory of St. Thomas on the reciprocal relations of body and soul, standing midway between these two opposing systems, takes into full account both the elements of our nature, and forms a complete anthropology, uniting in one harmonious synthesis, which is justified by the most recent discoveries of experimental science, physiology and psychology. E. Fasquier ('Les hypotheses cosniogoniques,' suite), con- tinuing his series of articles on the formation of the orderly universe, explains the hypothesis of Laplace, and discusses the chief objections .advanced by Faye against this hypothesis, together with the reply of Wolf to Faye's objections. M. de Wulf (' Qu'est-ce que la philosophic scolastique), criticises the false and incomplete notions of scholastic philosophy now current. Some of these are merely verbal or even tautological ; others are absolutely untrue. To say that scholastic phil- osophy was the philosophy of the Middle Ages will not satisfy M. de Wulf. Many systems of philosophy existed in the Middle Ages besides the scholastic, although it be undoubtedly true that the scholastic was the dominant system of that period. In future articles M. de Wulf will explain the true nature of scholastic philosophy, and attempt its suitable definition. C. Besse (' Leon Olle-Laprune ') commences an appreciation of the philosophical standpoint of Olle-Laprune with special reference to its bearing on the problems of religion and life. He discusses at some length the attitude of Olle-Laprune towards the system of Male- branche. D. Nys (' La Nature du compose chimique '), assuming that chemical compositions supply material for metaphysical as well as scientific investigations, sets forth the theories of St. Thomas on the subject, and maintains that there is nothing in modern science at vari- ance with these theories. D. Mercier (' La psychologic de Descartes,' suite et fin) brings to a conclusion his interesting and able criticisms of Descartes' psychology. ZtlTSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SlNNESORGANE. Bd. xviii., Heft 1, 2. P. Schumann. ' Zur Schaetzung leerer, von ^infachen Schalleindruecken begrenzter Zeiten.' [Restatement of the author's theory of the ' time sense,' in terms of strain of expectation and sensible surprise. Reply to Meumann (nine arguments), Wundt and Kuelpe : the general objections to the writer's theory appear to stand, the detailed objections to have had for the most part something in them, though Meumann's tone is inexcusable. New results : (1) evi- dence for the theory from Herbart and from various subjects ; (2) effect of an unexpectedly strong signal ; " with subjects whose estimation depends upon adjustment of attention, intensification of the third signal means shortening of the second interval, while with subjects who tend to rhythmical apprehension [as Meumann's did] it brings about a lengthening of this interval " ; (3) the constant time error, as dependent on adjustment of attention, rhythmical apprehension, or motor auto- matism ; (4) Meumann's statement that a long series of sounds appears to run more quickly than a succession of two or three is confirmed only when there is lapse of attention during the long series, when, i.e., the subject cannot ' expect ' its individual members ; (5) his statement that & strongly bounded ' least ' interval seems shorter than an equal but weakly bounded interval is not confirmed.] W. Wirth. ' Vorstellungs-