Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/200

186 G. E. MOORE : )J^*^ "^ 4 1 the two forms of proposition lies not in that the former lacks necessity, nor even that it implies the proposition ' Heaviness exists'; for even if heaviness did not exist, the proposition would be true. The proposition means that heaviness could not be other than an attribute ; and hence, if Kant's words- (p. 34) are to be taken strictly, it cannot be empirical. In this respect, therefore, it is quite on a level with ' 2 + 2 = 4 '; which also would be true even if there were no two things. The difference seems to lie rather in the nature of the concepts of which the necessary relation is predicated. "' Heaviness ' can exist ; it is not meaningless to say ' Heavi- ness exists here and now'; whereas 'attribute,' 'two,' and other like conceptions can only claim a precarious sort of existence in so far as they are necessarily related to these other notions of which alone properly existential propositions can be made. If, therefore, we wish to find propositions involving no neces- sity, 1 we must descend to purely existential propositions pro- positions which do not involve the notions of substance and attribute. These alone can be truly taught us by experience, if experience ' cannot teach us that a thing could not be otherwise' (p. 34). And even these are free from necessity, only if they are understood to assert something with regard to an actual part of actual time. They must involve neces- sity as soon as the distinction between ' This is ' and ' This was ' is disregarded. It would seem, in fact, to be a mark of the sort of existence which they predicate that it is in time. They may affirm ' This exists,' or ' This has existed,' but if they take the general form ' This is,' that must always be understood to mean no more than ' This always has been, is now, and always will be,' and can be strictly analysed into as many different judgments as time is divisible into separate moments. If, therefore, the difference between the empirical and a priori lay primarily, as Kant implies, in the nature of the judgment, not in that of the concept, only existential pro- positions could be empirical. In order to represent even ' This body is heavy ' as an empirical proposition, it would be necessary to analyse it into the form ' Heaviness and the marks of body exist here and now '. But this is certainly not its whole meaning. We must, therefore, suppose that in order to obtain a clear definition of what Kant meant by empirical propositions, we must base it upon the nature of the 1 Even these involve the necessary properties of time ; but this point may be reserved for later consideration.