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218 M. W. CALKINS : bination of qualities in a thing, by the coalescing of feelings in a mood, by the grouping of mathematical quantities in a, series, or by the rhythm which binds together notes in a, scale. The thesis of this paper is the assertion that Time and Causality are subordinate forms of this principle of the Necessary Connexion of phenomena, and that the third and co-ordinate form of the category is Keciprocal Determination,, not, as is often stated, Space. II TIME. (a) The Temporal Manifold. The reduction of these categories to the one fundamental principle of necessary connexion is best justified by a more detailed consideration of each one of them, and an investi- gation of the nature of time becomes therefore our immediate problem. To the question, What is time? the traditional answer is from the outset unsatisfactory, for it enumerates, two distinct attributes of time, duration and succession, without giving an inkling of their relation to each other. But at the first glance, these so-called time-relations reveal themselves as directly opposed ; the first is a form of unity, the second a kind of multiplicity ; and yet duration is in no sense the unity of the successive, but quite a different sort of unity ; it is a form of identity which consists in the oneness of one phenomenon with itself rather than that of many phenomena with each other. Duration, or permanence, is identity, regarded in direct comparison with succession and,, in fact, measured by succession. 1 Now if we are to choose between succession and duration as expressions of the real nature of time, there cannot well be any doubt of the decision. Things endure, qualities per- sist, one experience outlasts several others, but the essence of time is its restlessness, and the nature of time is the multiplicity, the succession, of its moments. The temporal sequence of course implies an enduring permanence, and is known only by contrast with it, but the succession, not the duration, is truly temporal. Everyday reflexion has always, indeed, identified time with succession, and has sharply emphasised its opposition to duration or permanence ; the " flight of time," the elusiveness of the moment, the stream 1 Cj. Schopenhauer, Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 4, p. 11 (8te Auflage) : " Das Zugleichsein vieler Zustande aber macht das Wesen der Wirkfichkeit aus, derm durch dasselbe wird allererst die Dauer moglich, indem diese nur erkennbar 1st an dern Wechsel der mit dem Dauernden zugleich Vorhandenen ".