Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/236

222 M. w. CALKINS : Thus the fundamental distinctions of time are based upon two sorts of necessity : first, the dependence of synthesis in general upon Ultimate Unity, and second, the dependence of the moment upon the preceding moment (which as ' irrevocable ' is regarded as peculiarly real). This now is the essential truth contained in all assertions of the oneness of time ; not a unity of one phenomenon with itself, as opposed to multiplicity the unity of dura- tion but the unity of the manifold, the related oneness of phenomena necessarily bound together. Schopenhauer states the doctrine unambiguously in his explicit teaching that time is only the " simplest of the forms" of the Law of Sufficient Reason. Schelling means the same by his expression, " Die Zeit hebt das Auseinander auf "- 1 Kant also grows gradually to this view of the essential likeness of temporal with causal unity. Only the traditional blunder of co-ordinating space and time, and of assuming that what is true of one is true of the other, seems to prevent his discovering that time belongs among the categories. The permanently valuable part of his theory of time is to be found, therefore, neither in the Aesthetik, where the dis- cussion of time follows the outline of the space-doctrine, nor in those passages of the Analytik which apply to time, in a matter-of-fact and mechanical way, all the predicates of space, but rather in the Second Analogy and in portions of the First and Third Antinomies, where time is treated as a category by being virtually identified with causality. For by the words, 2 "it is a formal condition of sense perception (Wahrnehmung) that the earlier time necessarily determine the later," Kant indicates that necessary connexion, which the essential of causality, is also the fundamental char- acteristic of time. Time, therefore, or the irreversible connexion of the irre- vocable, relatively abstract manifold, is clearly a form of the category of necessary connexion, and is closely related to causality ; the lighting of the fuse is no more ' necessarily connected ' with the explosion, than one moment with another. The only distinction is indeed this, that the temporal manifold is made up of moments, whereas the causal manifold is that of events, but the underlying unity is the same in both cases, that of the irreversible connexion of the irrevocable. 1 Weltseele, 3te Aufl., p. xxxv. 2 Op. cit., A., p. 199 ; B., p. 244.