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274 NEW BOOKS. me, I know what time is. But if the question be put, I find that I do not know." So wrote St. Augustine. A complete study of the notion of time comprises two fundamental questions, the psychological question as to the genesis of the idea of time, and the ontological question as to the objectivity of time. Viewed from the ontological standpoint, the theory of St. Thomas, as set forth in his various opuscula, notably in the opuscula ' de tempore,' and 'de instantibus,' may be described as moder- ate realism. Time has at once its objective and its subjective character. Abstracted from continuous movement, time possesses in movement a real being. Nevertheless, movement is not tune, nor can it become time without the concurrence of mind which breaks up its continuity, and reunites in a same whole the divers parts which it distinguishes there. Taken in its totality then, the concept of time designates a real, but essentially fugitive being, the present, and elements which, as such, have only an ideal reality, the future and the past. Hence the objective and the subjective character of time. Such, at least, is the theory of St. Thomas. In opposition to this moderate realism of St. Thomas stand, on the one hand, the idealistic and subjective theories which unduly depreciate, or even entirely suppress, the objective reality of time, and prominent amongst these are the theories of Kant, Leibnitz, Balmes, Descartes, Baumann, Locke, and Spencer ; and, on the other hand, the theories characterised by an exaggerated realism, and among the better known of these are the theories of Gassendi, Newton, and De San. The earlier and longer portion of M. Nys' very able treatise is devoted to an exposition and defence of the system of St. Thomas. The latter portion explains the various rival systems, and criticises each in detail. M. Nys' criticism of the Kantian system seems to be particularly good. Essai d'une Philosophie Nouvelle Suggeree par la Science. Par LEONCE RIBERT. Paris : Alcan, 1898. Pp. 562. By far the greater part of this work is taken up with a naive narration of the mythology of modern science, untroubled by criticism and with hardly a suspicion of the true nature of the problem which the sciences bequeath to philosophy. Its only novelty is found in the occasional in- troduction of a cosmological myth of the author's own (e.g., p. 509), and in his substitution for the usual ' Force ' of an " infinite potentiality " (virtualite), described as a principle of activity and supposed to generate all things by its conjunction with ' Matter '. But such divergences are neither emphasised nor fully worked out, and the general impression left by the book is that its author has a mind of the type which in Englanc finds full satisfaction for its intellectual needs and spiritual aspirations it the writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Accordingly M. Ribert, whose amiable character is plainly mirrored in his work, is exceedingly we" pleased with his conclusions, and cannot conceive how any one coulc wish for anything more. Hence he is much distressed and puzzled bj the symptoms of soul-sickness he detects around him, and by the pessi- mistic way in which the ' gospel of Science ' has been received by manj of the finest intelligences of France. His failure to understand why his nostrums should arouse only nausea in such minds and why people should talk about ' the bankruptcy of science,' sufficiently indicates his limits tions. It should, however, be admitted that his claims are modest anc that the preface stamps the book as un ouvrage de vulgarisation s phrase which the English reader is unfortunately too often tempted translate literally. Yet the style is good and the narrative flows in smooth and sparkling stream of lucid French ; only it will not be founc navigable for ocean-steamships.