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276 NEW BOOKS. which, in his opinion, can be made of psycho-physical parallelism and the law of association. Prof. Faggi anticipates a possible criticism by remarking that, since scientific analysis has made most progress in the region of sensations, he has necessarily devoted more space to this subject than to the higher functions of consciousness. The book is too short and written too much from the critical standpoint to be an exposi- tion of the author's own views. It contains four chapters, or, rather, four separate essays on Time and Space, Association and Apperception, Feelings and Emotions, Perception and Self-consciousness. In each case Prof. Faggi indicates the nature and the difficulties of the problem he is about to discuss, states briefly the views of various psychologists, makes comparisons and raises objections and, to some extent, explains the theory which he himself prefers. The reader's attention is drawn chiefly to the psychology of Wundt, Kiilpe, Ziehen and James, and the differences between them are clearly brought out. In a fifth and concluding chapter, entitled "Epilogue and Prologue," the author explains his general psychological attitude. The science of psychology, by the adoption of general principles, of which psycho- physical parallelism is the most important, has passed from the descrip- tive to the explanatory stage. Since all facts of consciousness are, as such, qualitatively diverse, the law of association can only hold good as a principle of psychological explanation if it is regarded as a manifesta- tion of physical laws. Movement and sensation are irreducible and in- commensurable. Consciousness is the limit of the natural knowledge of phenomena ; and on this side there can be no science, but only narration and description. To say this is not to advocate materialism. Physiology is concerned with organic functions in general, psychology with only those which have a psychical correlative ; and thus the two sciences overlap. "In spite of what Wundt himself may say to the contrary," Prof. Faggi remarks, " I maintain that the only scientific interpretation of his theory of apperception is the psycho-physical interpretation given by Kulpe." The psycho-physical point of view is, in fact, the psychological point of view. Psychical processes are conditioned by material changes in the organism ; but, since the opposition between matter and spirit is not real, but created by thought, the principle of parallelism is purely "regulative," and its interpretation has no scientific value. But the world of science is not the world of consciousness ; and " psychical materialism," as Prof. Faggi calls it, so far from being inconsistent with idealism, is rather a starting-point from which to arrive at it. " For the exigencies of practical life we need the existence of the Absolute, but Science can do nothing for this need except ascertain its physiological and psychological conditions." The book is clearly and concisely written, and should prove helpf and suggestive to students who have some elementary knowledge psychology. EECEIVED also : G. F. Stout, Manual of Psychology, vol. i. (The University Tutorial Series), London, W. B. Clive, 1898, pp. xii., 240. (4s. 6d.) Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1896, Washington, 1898, pp. 1L, 727. F. Pollock, Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy, second edition, London, Duckworth & Co. ; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1899, pp. xxiv., 427. (8s.)