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282 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. woman, and his attack on the Jesuits. Goes on to consider present situa- tion of Catholicism which is characterised by a change of attitude to- wards (1) philosophy, (2) socialism.] J.-J. van Biervliet. ' L'homme droit et 1'homme gauche (ll.).' [The asymmetry of the nervous system,.] Revue generale. Les travaux recents de psychophysique (conclusion). Analyses et comptes rendus, etc. REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. September, 1898. E. Chartier. ' Comrnentaire aux fragments de Jules Lagneau.' [This con- cluding article assigns to metaphysics three guiding ideas. First, the idea of truth ; that which no mind can refuse to admit, that which is necessary. Secondly, the idea of a nature that is thinking, absolute,, universal and necessary. The third belongs to method, the idea of re- flective analysis. This is described as the search for necessity by simple and clear definitions and rigorous demonstrations, in short, mathematics in an extended sense.] A. Lalande. 'Le langage philosophique et 1'unite de la philosophic.' [After expounding the excellence of the end r the unity of philosophy, and assigning the causes of the existing discord^ the author is sanguine enough to suggest as the means towards realising his ideal (1) individual research animated by the love of unity ; (2) per- manent collaboration, say by academies and societies ; (3) international conventions ; (4) reconstruction of the system of education. The functions of a philosophical society such as would carry on this good work are the revision of the philosophical vocabulary, and the publication of an elementary course of Philosophy. The terminology should be reformed by definitions, both historical, to give the meanings employed by the leading writers, and dogmatic, to fix future use.] Elie Halevy. ' Quelques remarques sur la notion d'intensite en psychologic.' [In- tensity appears in mental phenomena attached to sensation and to belief. Intensity of belief is measured by a fraction whose numerator is the number of reasons for the belief, and whose denominator is the total of reasons for and against. Though the mathematical measure is thus limited by the two extremes and 1, the psychological value may range from nothing to the indefinitely great. This arises from the infinite number of conditions determining everything concretely given in our experience. Hence we conclude that intensity of belief is not a simple, subjective element, but complex, the result of a reflective act. With regard to intensity of sensation, though a confused state of consciousness, yet psycho-physics measures it and assigns to it its laws. The well- known law connecting increment of excitation with increment of con- sciousness has its limitations and exceptions. The analogy betweer sensation and belief, in intensity, may be illustrated thus : If in a central telegraph station the wires bring in one after another intelligence that certain event has happened, the belief of the receiver of the messages in the truth of the news rises rapidly to the highest pitch of intensity. So, too, in sensation ; its intensity increases with the number of conditions of production involved. Thus intensity of sensation is also removed from the number of simple mental elements. The lesson drawn, in conclusion, is that the true method of psychology is to decompose, to analyse the synthesis already made by intelligence.] REVUE-NEO SCOLASTIQUE. No. 19. C. Besse ('Leon Olle-Laprune/ suite et fin) decides that the philosophy of Olle-Laprune is essentially a will-philosophy. Will and action lie at the root of everything. There is an element of will in the operations of mind. When I perceive, I attenc But what is attention but an act of will ? When I judge, I issue froi uncertainty and hesitation ; I decide between things compared. How this possible without an act of will ? Much more is will needed in the