that in them the words have a non-literal (uneigentliche) in addition to their literal meaning—the former is as it were to shine through the latter, in so far as the figure is to be understood. But it may also happen that the speaker does not wish to be understood, or at any rate not by all who hear him; he is content, indeed he prefers it, if only a few understand him, perhaps he even wishes not to be understood at all—that is, not in the complete way in which the nonliteral meaning is included. He desires then only to understand himself, and to communicate his real meaning only partially or apparently, or indeed to communicate only the exact opposite of it. Thus oratorical diction, e.g. irony, and especially hyperbole, borders on falsehood, and passes over into it. Falsehood is a use of words for a private end which is alien to them (i.e. to the social will contained in them)—for the end of exciting by apparent communication of our own thought an idea which differs from it, and in extreme cases is opposed to it. Here again in this special sense it is the power of belief—or as we might say by an obvious simile, the credit which the speaker enjoys—which gives their true significance to the words. This significance differs again according to the personality of the speaker and the words he uses; the same words have the full weight of their proper meaning when it is an honest man who has used them, and are empty words in the mouth of a knave or a downright swindler.
47. We contrasted with each other as the chief forms of the social will which gives meaning to words, the customary usage of language, and legislation in language. We now see that “popular belief” and “science” correspond to each other as opposites in a similar manner. Both forms of the social will may be regarded as delegates, popular belief of the customary use of language, science of legislation; i.e. as deputies which, within the whole sphere submitted to the formative power of custom or legislation, are armed with a special mandate, which they fulfil by attaching distinctive meanings to groups of words. In its application to language we will call popular belief the genius of language.
48. There is still one important form of the social will to be mentioned, which is as much the basis of legislation and science as the natural, we might say, animal conformity, “agreement,” is the basis of custom and popular belief. This form we call in its general nature “compact,” and in particular application to the meaning of signs Verabredung (convention). If we presuppose completely isolated individual wills, then compact is the natural and necessary form in
