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360 HASTINGS KASHDALL : the larger sum should be desired by a man for others as well as for himself. But the desire is one thing, the approval of it the judgment 'in a calm hour' that the desire of the action moved by it is reasonable is quite another thing. Without some ideal however indeterminate of a best state of existence, with the attainment of which the approved motive or action may be deemed compatible, the approval of it would seem impossible. Utilitarians have therefore to consider whether they can employ a criterion of action, as they do employ it, without some idea of ultimate good ; and, since a greatest possible sum of pleasures is a phrase to which no idea really corresponds, what is the idea which really actuates them in the employment of their criterion " (Pro- legomena to Ethics, 358, 359). (2) So Prof. Mackenzie: "Pleasures cannot be Summed. It follows from this that there cannot be any calculus of pleasures i.e., that the values of pleasures cannot be quanti- tatively estimated. For there can be no quantitative estimate of things that are not homogeneous. But, indeed, even apart from this consideration, there seems to be a certain confusion in the Hedonistic idea that we ought to aim at a greatest sum of pleasures. If pleasure is the one thing that is desirable, it is clear that a sum of pleasures cannot be desirable; for a sum of pleasures is not pleasure. We are apt to think that a sum of pleasures is pleasure, just as a sum of numbers is a number. But this is evidently not the case. A sum of pleasures is not pleasure, any more than a sum of men is a man. For pleasures, like men, cannot be added to one another. Conse- quently, if pleasure is the only thing that is desirable, a sum of pleasures cannot possibly be desirable. If the Hedonistic view were to be adopted, we ought always to desire the greatest pleasure i.e. we ought to aim at producing the most intense feeling of pleasure that it is possible to reach in some one's consciousness. This would be the highest aim. A sum of smaller pleasures in a number of different people's consciousnesses, could not be preferable to this ; because a sum of pleasures is not pleasure at all. The reason why this does not appear to be the case, is that we habitually think of the desirable thing for man not as a feeling of pleasure but as a continuous state of happiness. But a con- tinuous state of happiness is not a mere feeling of pleasure. It has a certain objective content. ISfow if we regard this content as the desirable thing, we do not regard the feeling of pleasure as the one thing that is desirable ; i.e. we abandon Hedonism " (Manual of Ethics, 1 pp. 112-113). 1 Cf. Prof. Mackenzie's Social Philosophy, pp. 222-227.