Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/385

CAN THERE BE A SUM OF PLEASURES? 371 notion that the total whole of pleasant consciousness is made up of distinguishable elements. I say distinguishable, i.e., logically distinguishable, not capable of actual separa- tion. My consciousness at any given moment is no doubt a whole which cannot be separated into parts like a material object, but it is possible to distinguish in this total psychosis many different elements. Sometimes the elements are cap- able of being distinguished even to the extent of retaining approximately when in combination the pleasurableness or painfuluess which they have when separate. Thus I may be conscious at one and the same time of a pain in my toe, another in my head, and a pleasant interest in the story that I am reading. At other times, and this is generally the case, no doubt, where no definite local pain enters into conscious- ness, the elements seem so far fused together that it is only by a considerable effort of reflexion (aided by memories which enable me to apply the method of difference or of concomitant variations) that I can distinguish how much of my total pleasant state is due to the different elements. That is the case, for instance, when I ask myself how much of the general sense of exhilaration which I have experienced at a pleasant party was due to the dinner, how much to the champagne, how much to the company ; or when I attempt to say how much of my depression is due to biliousness and how much to the disappointment or annoyance on which at such seasons I am apt to brood. And yet, in spite of all the difficulties of such discrimina- tion, we do make such distinctions in reflecting upon past pleasures, and we use the result of such experiences in guiding our choice in the future. We have two invitations for the same night. We say to ourselves : " True A's dinner will be less apolaustic than B's, but I like B's indifferent cham- pagne better than A's superior port and claret, and the conversation will be much better. Therefore to B's I will go, and A's invitation I will decline." It is true of course and this seems to be the only serious difficulty in treating such cases as a summation of pleasures that the hedonistic value of a pleasure in combination with others may be some- thing quite different from its value when taken by itself (or rather, since we never do enjoy an assignable pleasure absolutely " by itself ") when experienced in a different psychical setting or context. The dinner which helps us to enjoy the evening in pleasant company would simply bore the man who is not a gourmand, if consumed in solitude or in the company of dull persons. The values that we sum are altered by the summing or rather by the combination