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ON MR. s. HODGSON'S METAPUTSIC OF EXPERIENCE. 395 unity nor consistency. I mean of course in the absolute sense, as a body of doctrine it possesses both in an eminent degree. This absence of unity and consistency is not regarded by Mr. Hodgson as a defect but contrariwise as due to actual insight into the nature of a universe infinite in time and space. It has, however, for a philosopher this disadvantage, that without unity and consistency there can be no system, and system is necessary for a constructive philosophy. Mr. Hodgson has given us a reconstruction based on analysis, but to me it lacks principle and fails to bring conviction. It may be right, but, if it is, it is by being a lucky guess against infinite odds. It is in the ethical portion of Mr. Hodgson's work that the contrast between what I have called the criterion of consistency and the criterion of immediate perceptibility becomes most marked. The ethical part of this work is truly magnificent and I feel in substantial agreement with it although it seems to me unreconcilable with the world theory. The description of Conscience as Reason or Judg- ment dealing with the inwardness of conduct is especially fine. And here Mr. Hodgson frankly acknowledges the failure of the criterion of the merely felt and adopts the criterion of consistency and harmony. "It is not to the keenness or intensity, nor even to the felt specific quality, even in what we call the highest and noblest of the personal emotions, that their felt Tightness or moral goodness is attributable ; it is to their fulfilling the law of Harmony." " The whole of moral goodness may be well summed up under the two heads of Love and Justice. But these quali- ties, considered simply as feelings or affections, are not sufficient to account for that sense of moral validity or rightness by which they, and the actions which they attend or seem to prompt, are characterised. For this we must look to something which connects them with the whole of Existence and incorporates them with its laws, as well beyond as within the limits of our positive knowledge. Their validity arises from their being instances which exemplify and in a measure realise, in concrete existence, that Harmony which in its most abstract form is the synonym of Law itself" (iv., 190). How then does Mr. Hodgson attempt to reconcile this adoption of a new cri- terion with his world-theory? By differentiating practical reasoning from speculative reasoning and assigning to each a particular validity. The ideas of the Practical Reason have practical validity only, we cannot speak of their truth and falsity except with a difference. " As practical and not