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PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 477 as are borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults. But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment ; and so, indeed, are perfect cheats . . . and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them." But in the preceding sentence he remarks, that " wit and fancy finds easier entertainment in the world than dry truth and real knowledge " ; and this remains true to- day, notwithstanding the enormous progress of the sciences,, especially in those spheres, which we do not seek to know for any practical utility, the utility of which we do not see,. or which cannot even boast of any practical utility, at any rate for external ends. Psychology especially is the natural field for wit and imagination, and here instruction is re- luctantly undertaken when it has to vie with entertainment. And yet an entertaining instruction is by no means to be despised ; only it should be kept as sharply as possible distinct from the terminologically "dry," esoteric science. But the evil is to some extent, inherent in the development. Bold thoughts, in emancipating themselves, break through old forms, fixed rules, stiff technical expressions, as a flame, consuming and illuminating, " wanders along its own path^ the free daughter of nature ". In Germany especially, in the second half of this century, there is repeated in an abbreviated form the spectacle which the new philosophy as a whole presented as opposed to scholasticism. A new University-philosophy had been established. We will pass over its history here. It culminated in Hegel, who spoke his own language, his "jargon" as his opponents mockingly called it. As University-philosophers, opposed to his autocracy, none but Beneke (who never attained an " ordinariat ") and es- pecially Herbart, formed their own schools. But then again there appears, with wider influence, a crowd of free- masters, who make an eloquent and unsparing attack upon the whole "speculative" philosophy, just as the moderns did upon scholasticism in general ; but especially with com- plaints against the "incomprehensibility of the language". These are the more successful in winning over the public, because at the same time they pay their homage (with more or less reserve) to natural science which is once more breaking away from all philosophy, and because they are again approximating clearly to popular literature. The