Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/505

PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 491 itself (or its " effect ") in a single " action," or that it forms the rule of repeated similar activities i.e. of the feelings of activities. All that we maintain is, the value of this concept for the understanding of undoubted facts, e.g. of the fact that for every one something becomes the sign or mark of some- thing else, without being it by nature. The name is, in and for itself, completely indifferent; we think indeed that it extracts as it were the quintessence from everything which is ever thought of as human-rational will ; for this much is common to all those ideas : something affirming itself, affirming or denying other feelings and ideas. It is this again upon which the relation of every particular will to others is based ; and again a concept is necessary which expresses the unity of several wills, as affirming itself and affirming or denying its members. This we called "social will ". In it, it became obvious and clear that will, or whatever we may call the psychical power, is only apparently the "cause" of bodily movements, that it is nothing but power over its like ideas and feelings. But the relation of the individual will to itself and to the body belonging to it is nothing other. This is difficult, but not impossible to think It must be learned and practised. (To be concluded.)