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NEW BOOKS. 549 between Mill and Comte, though Mill was then nearer discipleship than any other Englishman. The "influence" exercised, . as M. Lt-vy-Bruhl makes clear, was entirely that of Comte on Mill. Mill was essentially " receptive," and thought that he and Comte might, by discussion, modify each other's " opinions ". Comte had not " opinions," but doctrines that were portions of a system. The question was whether any particular doctrine was logically connected with the rest. This he was prepared to consider, but anything that modified the system as a whole was not a point to be discussed. For him the " positive philosophy " has the character of positive science, and admits of no essential modifications. The divergences that came out most clearly related to the position of psychology in the system of the sciences and to the question about the inequality of the sexes. These, as M. Levy-Bruhl shows, were not unconnected. Comte entirely repudiated the " eighteenth century psy- chology, or, as he called it, " metaphysics ". Mill's adherence to it in principle was decisively shown by his inclination to regard human beings as approximately equal apart from differences of education. Ad- mitting that the position of Helvetius is exaggerated, he yet thinks there is a portion of truth in it which is neglected in Comte's view derived from Gall that there are ineradicable differences of faculty determined by the character of the organism. From this divergence the views of the two thinkers about the natural equality or inequality of the sexes are corollaries. In concluding, M. Le"vy-Bruhl draws attention to what is an even more important theoretical difference, though it was less con- nected with personal sentiment, and hardly comes into full view in the correspondence. Comte's notion that psychology should be treated as a branch of biology is of course not original. His real originality in rela- tion to psychology finds expression in the formula which M. Levy-Bruhl cites, that humanity must not be explained by the individual man, but man by humanity. Thus there can be no science of character, such as Mill's 'ethology,' prior to the study of the historical evolution of human- ity. M. Levy-Bruhl adds that Mill's throwing himself into a work on political economy must have put an end to all hope of agreement. This, however, had not yet presented itself as an irreconcilable difference. Comte, as may be seen in the letters, allowed to political economy a provisional value, and all along remained interested in Mill's treatment of it. As to its necessary subordination to the general science of society, both were at one. The actual agreement, of course, did not extend much beyond this most general position ; as no doubt would have become plain if the correspondence had continued till the Political Economy was published. T. WHITTAKER. L 1 'Ignorance et L'Irreflexion. Essai de Psychologic objective. Par L. G^RARD-VARET, Agrege de Philosophic, Docteur es Lettres. Paris : Felix Alcan, 1898. Pp. 296. Under its apparently vague title this is an original and interesting psycho- logical essay. What M. Gerard-Varet means by " ignorance " is the state of mind of the primitive man, who has " intelligence," but not the " reflective " consciousness characteristic of high civilisation. The author's method is to work backwards from the idealism which he finds to be implied in modern philosophy, and, having at length reached the twilight of the first human thinking, to return thence to the reflective stage. His first generalisation is that the farther back we go, the more of its own states does the mind attribute to something external. For. modern philosophy all consciousness however it may afterwards be interpreted is primarily the product of the subject, or else constitutes