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PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 565 Herein lies the difficulty and the justification of the system, the true discrimination of the universalis as abstract and the communis as con- crete (any translation of the latter term must cause confusion). Notiones rnmmunes represent what is wholly concrete, nay ultimately, solely of what is most concrete of all, Substance, God. Thus alone can we explain the warning " ne misceamus quae sunt in intellectu cum Us quae sunt in re," . . . a warning that otherwise so strangely contradicts the funda- mental equation. Further, Spinoza not merely disclaims a smuggled ontology, he even assigns the source of the illusion. " Thus (i.e., from the nature of this distinction) those fixed and eternal things, though singulars, will be to us, on account of their ubiquity and widespread power, as though they were universals or species." The system no longer appears as an unconscious transition from thought to reality, but conversely, as an endeavour to give hi the understanding the truest possible exposi- tion of the course of nature. Thus proof of the real existence of the content of the notiones communes there cannot be ; the existence itself would be classed as one of the notiones universales. Thus the proof of God's existence must take a secondary place ; properly speaking it is postulated. In confirmation of the theory advanced, the author points to the account of the degrees of knowledge the highest being not de- monstration but intuition. Then, too, the "criterion of truth" rests not on proof but on an immediate feeling of certainty. "As light reveals both itself and darkness, so truth is its own standard and that of the false." Why if truth be not proof, does Spinoza overwhelm us with proofs ? The answer must be that man's impotence, his subjection to passion, shuts him out from the high road to truth, leaving open only the second best pathway through proof. In further confirmation the author points out that the famous " Parallelism " must now receive a position in Spinoza's methodology as well as its accepted metaphysical import. Correctly stated it asserts that adequate thought corresponds to actual existence ; hence the development of knowledge out of the highest notions becomes a mirror of the development of things and events in nature itself.] Lie. Dr. C. Xmlmann in Stettin. ' Fichtes Anschauung vom Christenthum.' [After stating in exhaustive subdivisions Fichte's views of Christianity, Dr. Lulmann proceeds to a detailed criticism. His conclusion is that, following Kant's impulse, Fichte attempted to base Christianity on a foundation not dogmatic but purely speculative. That the first attempts failed need not cause surprise.] Adolf Lasson. ' Jahresbericht ueber Erscheinungen der philosophischen Litteratur in Frankreich aus den Jahren 1894-1895.' [A full and appreciative account of the philosophical productions of French writers during the two years mentioned. Its sympathetic character appears in the terms in which the author estimates the value of the work accomplished : The older literary excellencies of France are still to the fore, clearness of thought, skill in arrangement, agreeableness in form. New merits have appeared, an endeavour after thoroughness and a comprehensive erudition seeking to make use of whatever may have been done elsewhere or at other times.] VlERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FUR WlSSBNSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Jahrg. xxxiii., Heft 3. Christian v. Ehrenfels. ' Entgegnung auf H. Schwarz' Kritik der empirischen Willenspsychologie.' [S. objects that on E's theory the difference between an actual and a merely possible state of feeling is treated as an operative factor in mental process. E. replies that this is a misunderstanding, and illustrates by reference to water falling down a height and always tending to a lower level, though its de- scent is not determined by the difference in height between the point from which it falls and that to which it descends. In answer to other