Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/70

56 J. ELLIS MCTAGGABT : and B, we see that, A and B being different, x cannot mani- fest A by the same qualities with which it manifests B. There must therefore be some part of x which does not manifest A, and some part which does not manifest B. That is to say, neither A nor B could be the true End of x, since neither of them would correspond to the whole of it, and the part of x which did not correspond to either End would not be unified by it. Only one End therefore can be capable of uniting as its Means all the plurality of the universe, and as no system can stop short of embracing the whole universe, we must regard the whole of reality as forming a single system, with a single End. The conception of End in the Hegelian sense may perhaps be profitably compared to Liotze's conception of the unity which he calls M, by which all the particular Things in the world are united. At first sight, indeed, it might seem as if this M could be better compared with a system in Absolute Mechanism. It is easy to take it as if it were al- together secondary to the particular Things, and as if its only function was to pass on to one Thing the impulses received from another. But we must remember, first, that with- out M the Things would have no relations, and be absolutely isolated that is, would not exist at all. Therefore it is absolutely essential to the Things, and not secondary. And, secondly, Lotze asks us to " admit the supposition that the susceptibility, which we had to recognise in every finite Being a susceptibility in virtue of which it does not experi- ence changes without maintaining itself against them by reaction that this belongs also to the one, the truly existing M" (Metaphysic, section 70). Now this gives M a nature of its own. No doubt this nature is only expressible in Things, but still it is not a mere consequence of Things. The unity is as essential a side of the truth as the plurality. And this is very like the category of End. (I may be per- mitted to remark in passing that this ascription of a definite nature to M seems absolutely incompatible with the view, sometimes held, that Lotze can be correctly described as a Monadist.) SUBJECTIVE END. The full unity between Means and End, however, is not attained till we reach the last division of Teleology. At first they are regarded as of equal importance, indeed, and as closely united, but yet as being still separate entities in the sense that each has a nature of its own, though it could