Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/90

76 A. F. RAVENSHEAR: testing or verifying the statements by extraneous evidence -experiment or other means. Whenever this is resorted to we are approaching a new field. Just to the extent to which appeal is made to extraneous evidence we engage not so much in a deduction of reliability as in an inductive inquiry. It is true that a test may be applied merely here and there, perhaps as to accuracy, perhaps as to meaning, but such tests if sufficiently multiplied would in reality constitute an example of the full process of Induction. The hypothesis being that the evidence is true, it is established or overthrown .by its agreement or otherwise with the tests applied. Cross-examination as practised in the Law Courts the most powerful weapon conceivable for exposing falsification may indeed be regarded as a special case of this. It is impossible that any person should be aware, in framing an untrue story, of every discoverable fact that might have a bearing on it. Hence however fully he may harmonise his tale with all he knows, it is extremely unlikely that an ex- haustive cross-examination would not bring to light some conflict with matters not known to the witness, although known to others. The ' verification ' of the story in such cases fails. Conflict of Testimony or Authority. Up to this point com- plete concurrence of testimony only has been dealt with. But it is commonly recognised that ' substantial agreement coupled with circumstantial variety ' is of more value than precise accord between a number of witnesses ; since the latter imports a suspicion of collusion. Even when the variety in detail is considerable we may find that as to those parts in which there is no conflict the testimony is Teliable. This is not, however, an example of true conflict, since we here conclude only as to portions in which there is accord. Cases of true conflict are those in which one of two inconsistent assertions is preferred on account of the superior trustworthiness of its source. To illustrate ap- parent conflict of the former kind, we may suppose that we have a number of opposing statements easily separable into allegation as to matters of fact and inferences therefrom. If then we find that the divergence is wholly or mainly as to the inferential portions, we have, other circumstances being favourable, good ground for concluding that the matters of fact are correctly stated. In order to deal with true conflict of testimony as dis- tinguished from apparent conflict that is those cases in which the divergence is in detail or in matters irrelevant to what we wish to ascertain we have to determine on