Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/182

168 J- ELLIS MCTAGGART : There is another point to be considered before we pass to the Absolute Idea. Why, it may be asked, and asked with some reason, did we not proceed directly from Life to the third and final stage of Cognition, without passing through the two previous stages? We had already seen in Life that the unity and plurality had no meaning separate from each other that all the meaning of each was in the other, the plurality having no meaning but to express the unity, nor the unity but to unify the plurality. By the transition into Cognition we gained the further step that this plurality could only be a plurality of individuals, for each of which the unity existed. Could we not then, without pausing at Cognition Proper and Volition, at once have reached the conclusion that the harmony between the unity and the individuals was immediate and ultimate ? In a sense I believe that we could. I believe that a valid logical transition could have been made direct from Life to the third stage of Cognition. But I believe that Hegel was wise in leading us first through the other two stages. And this for two reasons. The first of these is that the introduction and refutation of Cognition Proper and Volition saves us from a mistake into which it might otherwise have been easy to fall. In the imperfect harmonies which we see in every-day life it is necessary that one side should be determining and one determined. For in these the harmonised things have an existence apart from their harmony. Some other reason than their existence is therefore required to account for the harmony, and this can only be the dependence of one on the other. The influence of this is strengthened by another circum- stance. The only example which we can find of the general category of Cognition is our own consciousness. But only perfect consciousness could be an example of the category in its highest form. And consciousness, as we know it, is never perfect. The knowledge and volition of which it is made up are never even perfect of their kind. And, if they were perfect of their kind, still they would not be adequate examples of the perfect category, since they each imply, as we have seen, that one side should be determining, and the other determined. Even supposing that emotion stands higher in this respect, still we never come across a state of consciousness which is pure emotion, or one which connects us completely with the whole universe. Since, therefore, in all analogies, and in all actual examples of the category the harmony is never seen to be